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PREFACE
 
To continue to build broadly based consensus on the future of human space exploration, the Fourth Community 
Workshop on Achievability and Sustainability of Human Exploration of Mars (AM IV), organized by Explore 
Mars, Inc. and the American Astronautical Society, was held at the DoubleTree Inn in Monrovia, CA., 
December 6–8, 2016.  Approximately 60 invited professionals from the industrial and commercial sectors, 
academia, and NASA, along with international colleagues, participated in the workshop. These individuals were 
chosen to be representative of the breadth of interests in astronaut and robotic Mars exploration.   
 
AM IV built upon the three previous Affordability and Sustainability Workshops (i.e., AM I–III) held in 2013, 
2014, and 2015 respectively. Those previous workshops assessed and reported on the affordability and 
sustainability of multiple scenarios for human exploration of Mars. For that reason, our organizing committee 
concluded that the 2016 workshop would concentrate specifically on achieving critical capabilities (or “long 
poles”) in human exploration of Mars. Nine expert teams were established and each was charged with assessing 
the achievability of one major element common among scenarios for initial human missions to Mars. Included 
in each assessment, each of which was critically reviewed during the workshop and which is reported on here, 
are such characteristics as key elements of the long pole and the length of time required for development, venues 
for demonstration, precursors, and scenarios that take advantage of the long pole.  
 
The output of the workshop consists of observations, findings, and recommendations will be presented to space 
agency leadership, policymakers, and at professional conferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The statements, views, opinions, findings, observations, and/or recommendations expressed herein as recorded and/or 
transcribed by the editors are those of the workshop participants, each acting solely in his/her individual capacity, and are 
not necessarily those of their respective employers and/or any other organizations and/or legal entities with which they are 
affiliated
 	
 
 
AM IV Workshop Participants, December, 2016 
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Mars Exploration “Long Pole” Thumbnails: Abbreviated Findings and Observations 
There are a relatively small number of major elements (“long poles”) required to enable initial human 
missions to the surface of Mars in the mid-2030s. Nine long poles were assessed in depth before and 
during this workshop and all were found to be achievable. That is, with sustained and focused 
investment, they all would be available for deployment within about fifteen years or less.  
 
Given the complexity and required long development time of several of these long poles, the highest-
priority finding of this workshop is that initiation in the very near term of design work, trade studies, 
and key technology investments is necessary to achieve the goal of a landed human mission on Mars 
within two decades.  
 
1. Mars System Reconnaissance: Higher-fidelity data on the Martian surface environment and its 
impact on crew and hardware operations is needed to guide architectural and engineering design 
decisions. The global and local distribution of water deposits (in the form of hydrated minerals or 
subsurface ice), planetary protection special regions, and local surface terrain and topography 
affect the selection of the landing site, its surface operations, and the systems that may benefit 
from its resources (e.g. life support, Mars ascent). Moreover, the local dust toxicity, particle size 
distribution, and extant biological potential characteristics can impact the health of the crew and 
the reliability of their supporting systems. Gathering sufficient data to inform these decisions 
requires supplementing existing datasets with at least one new focused orbital mission and one 
new surface precursor ground-truth mission, as well as the analysis of samples returned from the 
Martian surface. 
2. Aggregation, Refueling, and Resupply: Limitation on overall launch performance and launch rate 
require aggregating of Mars stack elements. Refueling and resupply is an effective strategy to 
mitigate undesirable mass growth of individual elements. To take advantage of this long pole, a 
logistics architecture needs to be defined, including locations, launch infrastructure, docking 
concept of operations and refueling. Operations in the Martian system are part of the challenge. 
ARRCs are achievable in the near term with current technology already in development. The 
primary challenges are: operations in deep space, including navigation and autonomous 
rendezvous and larger quantities of propellant, and different types such as xenon and cryogenic 
propellants. A pressing concern is the development of an overall strategy for using ARRCs, 
notably to ensure adequate and diverse supply chains to support crews in the martian system. It is 
our assessment that a robust strategy will add to mission flexibility and crew safety and may be 
critical to reducing the overall costs of Mars mission. Given NASA’s current plans for missions 
in the Proving Ground of cislunar space this long pole will be closed in about ten years, although 
given technology readiness levels this time an acceleration could reduce this time to about 7-8 
years. 
3. Transit Habitat: The long pole for transit habitation is an integrated design within a limited 
volume that protects the crew from increased radiation, keeps them healthy and productive, stores 
all the logistics they will need for the trip (>500 days) and in the harsh environment of deep 
space.  While building on lengthy experience from the ISS, NASA has done extensive studies and 
even built mockups to test different approaches. Public-private partnerships are in place to further 
develop this area.  
4. Entry, Descent and Landing of Human-class Payloads:  Entry, descent and landing (EDL) is a 
challenging problem today for science-class payloads such as the Mars 2020 rover.  It is a long 
pole for human-class missions because the payload mass that must be safely landed is much 
greater than the approximately one ton characteristic of current robotic missions and closer 20–40 
t for human-scale missions.  Simply scaling up the current approach will not work because of 
launch vehicle fairing diameter limitations. This requires examination of different approaches to 
decelerate and guide the payload to the surface.  At the same time, current exploration plans 
require that multiple payloads be landed in close proximity to one another, requiring much greater 
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precision in the landing guidance and control.  There are many approaches under consideration to 
address this (deployable heat shields, inflatables, and mid-L/D entry body designs) and it is 
imperative that decisions be made soon about the architecture to allow the concept selected to be 
matured in time for human missions in the early 2030s. 
5. Surface Habitat and Science Lab: This is a long pole for much the same reasons as the in-space 
habitat. However, there is also a tightly coupled relationship between the capabilities of the 
surface habitat and science laboratory and the capabilities of other systems (e.g., lander, EDL, 
etc.) that could lead to different or additional capabilities compared to the in-space habitat. The 
surface habitat and lab will build on experience gained from the development and operation of the 
transit habitat: both will build on the 15+ years of experience with ISS from which we learned 
that the primary challenge is habitability. That is, the system must be designed such that the small 
crew can live comfortably, accomplish all of the research and exploration tasks assigned to the 
mission, and recover from unexpected occurrences. At present, there is little confidence that 
results of studies of short duration – several weeks to several months – habitation tests 
extrapolates to a 500- to 1000-day mission. A longer-duration habitation capability will be 
required to be demonstrated in the 2020s to enable initial missions to Mars in the 2030s. 
6. Mars Surface Power: The decision on surface power technology will depend heavily on the 
expected longevity of the outpost, the extent of in-situ resource utilization (ISRU), and the 
landing location.  For shorter missions near the equator with minimal ISRU, solar power systems 
with nighttime energy storage seem sufficient. Solar power systems will be limited by reduced 
solar insolation and extended-duration dust storms, making radioisotope power systems an 
attractive emergency backup.  If the outpost is planned as a permanent staging node for repeated 
visits with a strong dependence on ISRU, nuclear fission is favored.  The long pole for Mars 
surface power spans both solar and nuclear options since no current technological solution exists 
to supply the 10s of kilowatts that will be needed for human missions given the challenging Mars 
environment. 
7. Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV): There is an increasing need for critical decisions to be made soon 
for those related to the overall Mars exploration architecture operational concept, functions, and 
performance requirements that impact the MAV: e.g., rendezvous orbit, the need for and 
availability of aborts during descent, reliance on ISRU. Resolution of these architectural-level 
issues for initial human missions are necessary in order to close long poles associated with the 
MAV. 
8. Human Health/Biomedicine: Crew health and performance are critical to successful human 
exploration beyond LEO. The work of NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP) is essential to 
enabling extended periods of space exploration through research and technology development 
activities that are aimed at mitigating risks to human health and performance. This program 
delivers human health and performance countermeasures, knowledge, technologies and tools to 
enable safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration. The achievability of this long pole 
– meaning adequate health and performance protection of astronauts during future deep space 
long duration missions - is expected to be possible based on a risk mitigation strategy that is very 
focused and applied. Human spaceflight risks include physiological and performance effects from 
the hazards of spaceflight, such as altered gravity, space radiation, and hostile environments, as 
well as unique challenges related to medical support, human factors, and behavioral health 
support. Risks and Concerns in the HRP research portfolio are within NASA’s Office of the Chief 
Health and Medical Officer. Priority research is a major component of the mitigation strategies, 
and are assigned to an Element within the HRP to quantify, mitigate, or monitor. 
9. Sustainability of NASA Mars exploration results from its value to stakeholders: value built into 
the enterprise to enable continuity after a few human missions as was the case with Apollo. This 
requires creating a critical mass of international partner and in-space economic private sector 
stakeholders. It will require sustained leadership and an architecture that returns value to these 
stakeholders, even if it involves intermediate destinations or new business models to do 
so. Potential intermediate destinations need to be part of an ever-expanding base of international 
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partnerships among in-space private-sector stakeholders for an exploration of Mars founded upon 
mutual value. 
10. Planetary protection: Although planning for Mars missions can build upon a long history of 
policies and practices used for robotic exploration missions, human missions beyond LEO have 
been limited to the small number during the Apollo Program. There is a recognized need to 
update, adapt and replace Apollo-era planetary protection practices in ways that reflect advances 
in science understanding about planetary environments, recent information about the human 
microbiome, technological improvements in many areas, and legal/policy changes.  Considerable 
cross-cutting R&TD are needed for integrating planetary controls and requirements into plans for 
future human missions to Mars. 
11. Lunar surface operations in advance of human missions to Mars:  In the series of four community 
workshops, there continues to be little or no support for either demonstration programs with 
humans on the lunar surface nor for the search for usable resources to enable initial human 
missions to Mars. Both were judged unnecessary, costly, and at present almost entirely devoid of 
sufficient engineering designs, trade studies, comparison with terrestrial supply, technology 
development plans that included launch vehicles in the lunar environment, and return on 
investment.  
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Background, Goals, and Structure 
 
Planning for the fourth in our unique series of community-based workshops on affordable, achievable, 
and sustainable scenarios for human exploration of Mars began shortly after the third workshop 
concluded in December 2015. These workshops, organized jointly under the auspices of Explore Mars, 
Inc. and the American Astronautical Society, bring together experts from industry and commerce, 
academia, government, and other space communities. These individuals were selected as representative 
experts in their respective fields.   
 
The first three workshops concentrated on assessing and reporting on the affordability and sustainability 
of scenarios for initial human exploration of Mars as developed by industry and NASA. AM I, which was 
held in Washington, D.C. in December 2013, evaluated industry and government policies and practices 
that limit cost and seek schedule savings for initial human missions to Mars1. Building upon the findings 
and recommendations from this first workshop, AM II, which was held at the Keck Institute in Pasadena 
in October 2014, compared and contrasted scenarios, architectures, and sample strategies developed by 
industry, academia, and NASA that are intended to significantly reduce costs for human space flight 
(HSF) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO), especially to Mars. At that second workshop a team of experienced 
Mars scientists was included in a breakout session to assess the role of human-enabled science 
exploration as an integral part of proposed HSF architectures. Involving scientists in assessing HSF 
scenarios was found to be so valuable in AM II that AM III, which was held at The George Washington 
University in Washington, D.C. in December 2015, included an even larger contingent of practicing 
scientists in the planning, execution, and reporting from the workshop.  
 
Formal reports from all of these workshops are widely available, briefed to senior NASA leaders, and 
presented at numerous professional conferences. [More information about all workshops and their 
deliverables may be found at http://www.exploremars.org/affording-human-exploration-of-mars .]  
 
Following AM III and based on discussions held there, the organizing committee concluded that for the 
fourth community workshop in the series, participants should concentrate on the achievability, as well as 
the sustainability, of major elements (i.e., “long poles”) of published Mars exploration scenarios. 
Specifically, the motivating principle behind AM IV was that it would be of little value to human 
exploration stakeholders to consider scenarios for human exploration that are not plausibly achievable 
over the time period of the next two decades. 																																																								
1 All four workshops emphasize, unless otherwise stated, initial human missions to Mars with the goal of a landed 
mission by the mid-2030s. 
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Approximately sixty professionals participated in this invitation-only workshop, including senior NASA 
and non-government managers, scientists, engineers, technologists, as well as international colleagues. 
Individuals were chosen to be representative of stakeholders in astronaut and robotic exploration of Mars. 
Sponsors of the workshop once again were Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, Aerojet Rocketdyne, 
and MDA. 
 
To make progress in a relatively short workshop, even with a number of preparatory and follow-on tasks, 
the organizers adopted a handful of guiding assumptions and ground rules, including: 
• It is the stated goal of Congress and NASA leadership that the exploration of Mars with 
astronauts will take place before the mid-2030s. 
• Early and focused technology investment, including robotic and human precursors and 
demonstration missions, is essential for the timescale for Mars exploration adopted here. 
• Technical/engineering solutions exist for landing and long-duration operations on the martian 
surface; that is, no “miracles” are required for successful Mars exploration. 
• Partnerships (international, industrial, commercial, academic, government and others) will be an 
essential component of human Mars exploration. 
• Research and development will continue on the International Space Station (ISS) at least through 
the mid-2020s. 
• The Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion will be available during the time period considered 
here, so will not be assessed in depth in this workshop. 
• The budgets for space agencies will be approximately flat in real dollars at least for the next few 
years. Budget growth is possible in response to an international commitment to travel to Mars. 
• Venues proposed for demonstration or precursor activities in advance of human missions to Mars 
in the 2030s must be assessed critically.  
 
Preparation for the workshop included agreeing upon definitions that would be used throughout this 
activity, including 
 
An affordable program is an activity that stakeholders are willing to support because it returns 
value commensurate with its cost. A Level 0 requirement for credible Mars human exploration 
architectures must be identification of the sustaining sources of funding and how the architecture 
will return value to stakeholders. An achievable element of an exploration scenario is one that, 
given sufficient funding, can be developed and deployed for operation sufficiently in advance of 
early human missions to Mars in the early- to mid-2030s. A sustainable campaign is one that is 
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affordable with returned value sufficient to ensure stakeholder support over decades. Specifically, 
what will enable human Mars missions to endure after the first several missions, unlike the case 
with the Apollo Program? And what will overcome a “been there, done that” response to initial 
human missions? A sustainable program is by definition affordable, although an affordable 
program is not by definition sustainable. 
 
Preparation for AM IV began about three months in advance of the workshop by identifying and defining 
various “long poles” that are major elements necessary for the early human exploration of Mars (see 
below). Each long pole was assessed by a team of workshop participants who were charged with 
producing a description of how, when, and why each pole will be achieved over the next decade or two. 
The assessment teams, which also contributed to the chapters in this report, are listed at the start of this 
report. At the workshop, each of the long pole justifications was critically reviewed in plenary and in 
more focused breakout sessions. The team responsible for each pole then revised their presentations in 
response to input from workshop participants. Revised assessments were presented in plenary to close the 
meeting. As part of the workshop, current scenarios or proposals about human exploration of Mars were 
briefly presented by representatives from NASA HQ, Orbital ATK, Boeing, JPL, Aerojet Rocketdyne, 
Lockheed Martin, SpaceX, and Blue Origin. 
 
Major Capabilities Necessary to Human Exploration of Mars (“Long Poles”)   
 
“Long Poles” Considered by AM IV 
 
Nine major capabilities (i.e., “long poles”) were assessed in depth by their respective assessment team in 
advance of the workshop. They were then presented and critiqued in plenary during the workshop, with 
updates and revisions made during extensive breakout sessions. The following chapters, one for each of 
the long poles, were developed from the input from participants during, as well as after, the workshop. 
The specific capabilities initially chosen for consideration by our workshop satisfied three criteria: (1) 
each is a significant element within current human Mars exploration scenarios, (2) its development has 
proceeded far enough at this time that input from AM IV would be meaningful, and (3) significant 
contribution to its development could be achieved by a three-day workshop that included extensive pre- 
and post-workshop work. 
 
The nine capabilities discussed in depth in the following chapters are listed in our table of contents. 
 
“Long Poles” Not Considered by AM IV 
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A number of major human exploration capabilities were not considered at AM IV, primarily because 
these were deemed to be already in advanced development or were not found critical to enable early 
human missions to the Red Planet’s surface. These long poles were  (1) Mars transfer propulsion (i.e., 
solar electric propulsion (SEP) and high-thrust chemical), (2) heavy lift (i.e., Space Launch System), (3) 
Orion crew vehicle (i.e., an Earth launch and re-entry vehicle), (4) Mars human-class surface rover, and 
(5) space suits: surface and in-space. 
 
Notional “Long Pole” Report Contents 
 
Although the long poles considered by AM IV are a disparate group, as guidance to the nine assessment 
teams, the workshop organizing team requested each assessment team to incorporate, if applicable to the 
long pole, the following contents in their presentations.  
 
(1) Major elements and key characteristics of the “long pole” (assuming a long-stay surface mission): 
• Basic description: “sub-poles,” key technologies/capabilities  
• Why this is a “long pole” and why this needs to be developed 
• Why this is challenging and why this is achievable (with substantive reasons: e.g., high 
TRL/SOA, advanced SOA, few or no “miracles” required) 
(2) Development plan(s) or options, if any, to make this achievable: 
• Milestones, investment strategy and priorities, 
• Precursor and demonstration site(s), where is this being developed (US aerospace, NASA, 
academia, internationals?), 
• Time to close “long pole” 
• Planned or expected time to close, including “sub-poles” 
• Required time to close, if different from above 
• Creative alternatives, if any, for accelerating closing 
  
(3) Gaps, shortcomings, or missing elements, so far as is known, in current “long poles” and their plans 
(e.g., lack of precursors/demos, disconnect among schedules, irrelevance to scenarios) 
  
(4) The role in enabling early human mission to the surface of Mars, if any, of human operations on the 
lunar surface. 
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Human Operations on the Lunar Surface  
to Enable Human Exploration of Mars 
 
The scientific importance of lunar exploration is persuasive, has been identified as a high priority by 
multiple space agencies, and has been discussed extensively elsewhere.  These scientific merits were not 
discussed at AM IV. A largely independent issue is whether, as asserted by some advocates, human 
operations on the lunar surface are either required or highly desirable in advance of initial human 
missions to the vicinity of or to the surface of Mars. This topic was discussed in advance of the AM IV 
workshop and in plenary at the workshop. In each of the following chapters, venues – including the 
vicinity and surface of the Moon – identified as necessary to retire risk for individual “long poles” are 
included as concluded by each of these expert groups. 
 
These discussions did not assess the value of astronauts on the lunar surface for other purposes, such as 
scientific exploration, nor was the relative value of sustained human occupation of the Moon versus Mars 
discussed. Assessment at this AM IV workshop, and the three preceding AM workshops, was focused 
solely on the assertion that lunar surface operations with astronauts was necessary in advance of initial 
human missions to the Red Planet.  
 
Arguments as to the value of lunar surface operations by humans in support of eventual human missions 
to Mars generally fall into three broad categories:  
(1) the lunar surface is claimed as a necessary demonstration site,  
(2) lunar surface resources, specifically water ice, could be extracted and turned into rocket 
fuel as a priority justification for eventual lunar industrialization, and/or   
(3) lunar surface missions could create international partner and in-space economic private 
sector stakeholders that would strengthen Mars exploration program sustainability.   
 
The first justification is widely considered of minimal value, at best, by experts on Mars exploration, as 
the two worlds are so profoundly different. For example, the existence of an atmosphere has substantial 
implications on the entry phase of a Mars mission, as well as requiring different approaches for thermal 
control for habitable elements and long-term storage of cryogenic propellants. Although both planets have 
a dusty environment, the dust properties are significantly different, leading to different operations and 
mitigation approaches. Complex systems, such as EVA equipment and surface rovers, designed for 
optimal use in a Martian gravity environment, will be over-designed for a lunar environment.  These 
examples, among others, indicate that, although certain subsystems could be designed and used at both 
locations, the system-level designs will have significant differences.  This means separate design and 
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development phases for lunar systems and Martian systems.  It also calls into question the degree to 
which design lessons learned on the Moon will be relevant on Mars. 
 
The second justification is frequently criticized for its lack of sufficient detail for a credible cost and 
feasibility comparison with, for example, supplying resources from the Earth’s surface. This shortcoming 
includes a lack of verification that the ice resources are actually present and accessible in a usable form in 
sufficient quantities. In addition, many current scenarios for human missions to Mars do not make 
extensive use of the fuel that could be derived from hypothetically available lunar water ice. Furthermore, 
anyone familiar with the time and resources needed to develop a promising resource feedstock into a 
reliable source of propellant that will be in the critical path for any major endeavor, will realize that 
industrialization of lunar water ice will require a sustained investment of time, resources, and refinement 
of operations likely lasting for many decades before propellants in a usable amount might be available.  
 
The third justification is not unique to the lunar surface, but rather is expected to be applicable to any 
destination for human space flight as demonstrated by the wide-ranging and long-term support for the ISS 
among international partners and more recently by commercial entities. Potential intermediate 
destinations need to be used as a mechanism to build an ever-increasing base of international partner and 
in-space economic private sector stakeholders for sustained Mars exploration founded on mutual value. It 
will be NASA leadership via a national policy of commitment to in-space economic development and 
international partnership(s) that will lead to a sustainable program of human exploration throughout the 
solar system, not the order in which future destination for these human exploration missions are carried 
out. 
 
To summarize, at AM IV, as was the case at AM I–III, there was little or no support among participants 
for either demonstration programs with humans on the lunar surface nor for the search for possible 
suitable water ice fuel stocks and subsequent industrialization to extract it to substantially reduce risk or 
reduce the overall time or resources needed. Both were judged unnecessary, costly, and – in the case of 
lunar industrialization – at present almost entirely devoid of sufficient engineering designs and milestones, 
trade studies (e.g., robots versus astronauts, source(s) of water ice), comparison with terrestrial supply, 
technology development plans including launch vehicles in the lunar environment, and a credible return 
on investment for governments and/or industry that indicate this approach would improve the prospects 
for initial human missions to Mars. 
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Planetary Protection and Mars Exploration 
   
Given that achievability of Mars human exploration is the primary focus of the workshop, planetary 
protection is a critical element for consideration, to identify priority near-term actions and investments 
necessary to ensure effective integration into relevant future activities on the appropriate timescales.  
Overview information on planetary protection for human Mars missions is summarized below, with 
additional information provided in the Appendix.  
   
Planetary protection supports multiple human exploration objectives at Mars, including assuring astronaut 
health and minimizing the potential for Earth invasive species to disrupt future exploration.  The nine 
identified future “long poles” focus largely on important science and technology needs for realizing 
achievable and sustainable human missions.  In addition, the existing international and NASA policy and 
implementation requirements for planetary protection also need to be included, because they represent 
challenges to different phases of mission planning that cut across the long poles already 
identified.   Consequently, a brief summary of the important planetary protection issues was presented at 
the workshop, to educate participants and sub-groups about current and potential future consequences of 
planetary protection policies for mission architecture and future implementation.  Integrating such 
information in the early planning phases is important to encourage cross-cutting deliberations and 
planning that will help avoid costly re-designs in later mission phases.  
   
For both NASA and international space missions beyond Earth orbit, integration of planetary protection 
considerations is considered mandatory under Article IX of the UN Outer Space Treaty2, which stipulates 
that  
“ … Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse 
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, 
where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose . . .”  
 
In addition, Article VI of the Treaty indicates that signatory States  
   
“…bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, ….whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities…”  and must assure that … 
“national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the …Treaty.”   In 
																																																								
2 UN Outer Space Treaty:   https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm   	
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addition….” The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, shall require authorization and 
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”  
   
Since the earliest days of space missions, planetary protection policies have applied to both robotic and 
human missions beyond Earth orbit.  During the Apollo Program, concerns relating to assuring Earth 
safety were addressed more effectively at a policy level than during actual implementation. 
Internationally, policies and frameworks for planetary protection are currently maintained by the 
Committee on Space Research (COSPAR)3.  In the United States, NASA develops and oversees the 
implementation of planetary protection policies and controls on missions launched using NASA assets4. 
   
Fortunately, planning efforts for Mars human missions can borrow and build upon decades of successful 
planetary protection implementation.  NASA and other space agencies have extensive experience 
applying planetary protection measures to robotic exploration missions to the Moon, Mars and other 
celestial bodies.  However, to date, the only times that planetary protection controls were applied to 
human missions beyond low Earth orbit occurred during the Apollo Program, when Apollo 11, 12, and 
14-17 landed on the lunar surface5. Significant improvements in understanding since that time are being 
incorporated into planetary protection for human missions to Mars, including advances in scientific 
inquiries into planetary environments and Earth biology (e.g., the human microbiome); major 
technological improvements in many systems; and revisions of environmental, health and safety 
laws/policies in the U.S. and internationally.  
   
While an overview of current planetary protection information and research priorities was presented to 
AM IV workshop participants, there is undoubtedly a need for more detailed discussions at future 
workshops.  At the very least, each subgroup needs to determine to what extent planetary protection 
policies and requirements may impact their particular long pole.   It is also important to consider how 
integration of planetary protection controls and requirements might alter their assessments of challenges, 
data gaps, design options, mission alternatives, and timetables for achieving future human missions.    
   
Based on current COSPAR Principles and Guidelines for Planetary Protection and Human Missions, there 
are many aspects of missions that likely will need special attention, including: habitation and laboratory 
elements –both in transit and on the Mars surface; assessment of possible ISRU areas, landing zones and 																																																								3	COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy:  https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicy.pdf    4	NASA Planetary Protection Website:   https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents	5	While there is considerable useful information from ISS and other orbital platforms in Earth orbit, none of these 
earlier orbital human missions had to address planetary protection concerns, which specifically apply to harmful 
contamination delivered to or from extraterrestrial bodies beyond Earth orbit. 	
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Special Regions on Mars; a range of human health and biomedical systems applicable in transit and on 
the surface;  back contamination controls, quarantine capabilities, and microbial monitoring; and 
development of national and international requirements associated with return of astronauts and sample 
materials to Earth. Accordingly, as the space community sets its sights on achievable, affordable, 
sustainable future human Mars missions, it should also be mindful of the need to integrate into all mission 
phases the broad range of new and changing information about planetary protection policies and 
implementation controls. 
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Long Pole 1: Mars System Reconnaissance in Advance of Astronaut Missions 
 
The Long Pole 
 
Certain specific data sets are needed to guide architecture and engineering design of a long-stay mission 
to the Martian surface that require reconnaissance activities at Mars, specifically ground truth for 
resources, surface mapping, and linkage to orbital data; knowledge of atmospheric dynamics; surface dust 
environment; health considerations (toxicity, extant biological potential); mapping of special regions for 
potential “forward” planetary protection/contamination concerns; demonstration of proof-of-concept 
hardware systems (such as in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) production) in the relevant environment 
interacting with indigenous materials. 
Major Elements of the Long Pole 
A. Biological, geochemical, and atmospheric reconnaissance to retire strategic knowledge gaps 
B. In-situ resource utilization 
a. Reconnaissance to determine where minimally acceptable resources are located and their 
attributes 
b. Development of technology needed to use those resources 
C. Reconnaissance to establish/optimize astronaut-enabled science program (now largely complete) 
D. Landing site selection 
 
Statement of Achievability 
 
Full set of measurements can be collected via  (1) focused set of orbital observations from future robotic 
orbiter(s) to identify most promising candidate resource deposits; (2) at least one robotic surface mission 
to the intended crew landing site to provide site-specific ground-truth measurements; (3) other 
opportunistic measurements to fill remaining priority strategic knowledge gaps, which could be combined 
with either #1 or #2 above and should not need a separate mission, if appropriately planned and funded); 
and (4) analysis of martian materials (from any site) already to be returned to Earth for other scientific 
purposes for exploration measurements such as toxicity, extant biological potential, dust particle size 
distribution of the general Mars environment (not site specific). 
 
Primary challenge to closing long pole: Identify from orbit and characterize/demonstrate resource 
extraction feasibility from surface sites with adequate resource potential to support long-term sustained 
exploration operations. 
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Secondary challenges to closing long pole: (1) Demonstration of ISRU and off-Earth mining techniques 
and technologies and (2) Filling of other strategic knowledge gaps required to enable design of the crew 
landing and surface systems. 
 
Time to close long pole: 10-12 years: 6-8 years for orbital asset to identify sites and 4-6 years for surface 
ground truth from robotic precursor from landing site. This assumes missions that enable analysis of 
returned samples, if needed (e.g. dust characteristics, toxicity, particle size distribution, etc.), occur in 
parallel over similar time frame. 
 
Closing long pole requires access to (at a minimum): Surface of Mars 
 
Primary Challenge to Achievability: Identify from orbit and characterize/demonstrate resource extraction 
feasibility from surface sites with adequate resource potential to support long-term sustained exploration 
enterprise. 
   
Current State of Knowledge and Practice for Primary Challenge: Potentially promising sites with ice 
deposits at TBD depth and hydrated minerals of uncertain water content and material properties have 
been detected using prior orbital missions and data sets.   
 
Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
Minimum success criteria can be met with at least one new focused orbital mission and one new surface 
precursor ground-truth mission.  
• Concept development work for orbital mission to collect data sets specific to identifying places 
with the most promising resource potential for human exploration.  
• Concept development work for future surface precursor ground-truth mission.  
• Ongoing plans for scientific sample return.   
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole Primary Challenge 
• Combination of mission objectives to improve cost-effectiveness: e.g. combine resource 
prospecting measurements from either orbit or surface with other robotic missions such as Mars 
sample return orbiters or landers. 
 
Secondary Challenge to Achievability (1): Demonstration of ISRU and off-Earth mining techniques and 
technologies.   
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Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole Secondary Challenge: Investment in ISRU 
technology maturation in terrestrial laboratories and mission concept development work for future in situ 
demonstration/proof-of-concept robotic precursor mission. 
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole Secondary Challenge: 
Conduct as much ISRU proof-of-concept development and testing as possible in terrestrial environmental 
chambers using analog materials before deploying systems to Mars surface. 
 
Secondary Challenge to Achievability (2): Filling of other strategic knowledge gaps required to enable 
design of the crew landing and surface systems. 
 
Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole Secondary Challenge:  
• List of strategic knowledge gaps and measurements required to fill them being maintained and 
coordinated through the Mars Exploration Program Analysis Group (MEPAG).   
• Instruments incorporated into ongoing robotic missions as technical and budget resources permit. 
However, planetary protection requirements need to be considered for contamination 
control/cleaning/reuse of instruments for sampling in subsurface or special regions. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Potential exploration zones for human missions to the surface of Mars 
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Long Pole 2: Development of a Robust Aggregation, Refueling and Re-Supply Capability to 
Support Successful and Sustained Human Missions to Mars 
 
 
The Long Pole 
 
Limitation on overall launch performance and launch rate require aggregating of Mars stack elements. 
Refueling and resupply is an effective strategy to mitigate individual element mass growth. Furthermore, 
a logistics architecture needs to be defined, including locations, launch infrastructure, docking concept of 
operations and refueling. Operations in the Martian system are part of the challenge.  
 
Statement of Achievability 
 
ARRCs are achievable in the near term with current technology already in development. The primary 
challenges are: 
• Operations in deep space, including navigation and autonomous rendezvous 
• Larger quantities of propellant, and different types such as Xenon and cryogenic propellants 
Given NASA’s current plans for missions in the Proving Ground of cislunar space this long pole will be 
closed in about ten years, although given technology readiness levels this time an acceleration could 
reduce this time to about 7-8 years. Figure 2 shows an example schedule for development of the ARRC 
concept. 
	
Figure 1. ARRC Development Schedule 
 
Primary Challenge to Achievability 
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A most pressing concern from our perspective is the development of an overall strategy for using ARRCs, 
most notably to ensure adequate and diverse supply chains to support our crews in the Martian system. It 
is our assessment that a robust strategy will add to mission flexibility and crew safety and may be critical 
to reducing the overall costs of Mars missions.  
 
In the following section, it is our goal to start that conversation and outline a number of key 
considerations.  
 
A Preliminary Look at How Logistics Nodes can Help Enable Successful and Sustainable Human 
Missions to Mars 
 
Logistic supply chains are a critical component of any human operation occurring over large distances. 
The importance of these supply chains has routinely been seen in military campaigns as well as in all 
major exploration efforts ranging from the Lewis & Clark Expedition to Antarctic expeditions to the 
International Space Station. A robust logistics system is a key difference between initial exploration and 
later sustained operations and is vital to risk reduction. 
 
A comprehensive plan for caching supplies, such as consumables and spare parts, can be critical for 
ensuring mission success and minimizing risk to human lives. Missions to Mars are no different.  
 
For Mars missions, there are basically three general locations where supplies can be aggregated/cached 
besides the surface of the Earth. They are Earth orbit/cislunar space, Mars orbit, and the Martian surface, 
which includes sub-surface, if applicable.  
 
As was the case with Antarctic exploration, nodes allow stockpiling critical supplies and react to 
unexpected events such as mechanical failures or medical emergencies.  Diversity of the supply chain is 
critical for ensuring a steady stream of supplies, and certain nodes should be multi-modal, supporting 
multiple types of transportation.  In the case of Antarctic support, Christchurch, New Zealand is such a 
node where the efficiencies of aircraft, trucks, trains, and ships can all be exploited and merged for the 
final leg of re-supply to the Antarctic.  Analogous lesson have been learned on the International Space 
Station (ISS).  
 
In the following sections, these lessons learned are assessed as to their application to Mars mission 
designs.  
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For the potential orbital supply caching/re-supply nodes at Earth/cislunar space and at Mars, we refer to 
such a node as an Aggregation, Refueling, Resupply Capability (ARRC).  For the node on the Martian 
surface, it is assumed to be a semi-permanent base. This base is referred to as the Human Exploration 
Zone or EZ, as was defined in the recent Mars Human Landing Sites Study (HLS2) workshop.  
 
The existence of a logistics node does not mean that all logistics go through that node; we would, in fact, 
expect several different paths for delivering logistics to the end goal, the Martian base. However, we 
would expect a significant percentage of the logistics to pass through most if not all of the nodes. The 
total logistics system supports all vehicles, even if they bypass a node.  
 
Characteristics of an ARRC 
An ARRC is primarily a series of nodes with core capabilities such as attitude control and power 
generation. Figure 2 shows that logistics nodes are differentiated by both location and operational intent. 
 
Figure 2. Logistic Node Differentiation 
We envision there definitely being an ARRC in high Earth orbit (HEO) or cis-lunar space.  The case for 
an ARRC in Mars orbit, probably high Mars Orbit (HMO), needs to be studied more extensively but may 
offer some very interesting options. An ARRC in HMO could conceivably be a sub-set orsmaller version 
of the one in cislunar/HEO.  
 
Logistics Nodes are Differentiated by...
• Location, and… • Operational Intent
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Long-term	
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*With	in-space	transportation	
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earth	node	locations?	 
	 24	
In HEO/cisunar space, the ARRC is where the Mars Transfer Vehicle (MTV) is initially aggregated. It is 
also where the MTV may dock upon returning from Mars and is refurbished and resupplied for the next 
mission to Mars.  
 
In HMO, the ARRC would be where logistics modules with critical supplies, consumables and spare parts 
are docked awaiting the MTV.  An appropriately designed ARRC could also serve as a safe haven for 
crews on their missions to Mars if repairs cannot be affected on the outbound leg or while in the Martian 
system. This potentially increases overall system safety. The safe haven concept may obviate the need to 
develop certain technologies prior to embarking on the first human missions to Mars. A critical purpose 
of this section is to begin examination of this potential.  
 
The ARRC in HEO/Cis-Lunar Space 
 
The optimal location of an ARRC in the Earth-Moon system needs to be assessed. Current NASA Mars 
architectures assume that the aggregation would occur in a stable lunar orbit like a Distant Lunar 
Retrograde Orbit (DLRO). There were two principal drivers for this: the Space Launch System (SLS) will 
be able to place usable masses this far out, and the orbit is stable for parking any parts of an asteroid 
retrieved from an Asteroid Redirect Mission (and thus keeping them from potentially impacting the Earth).  
 
However for a Humans-to-Mars focused architecture it’s not clear that this is the optimal orbit for 
aggregating. Increasingly, it appears that robustness of supply chain may be more important and that 
having an ARRC that multiple launch providers, both commercial and international, can reach with usable 
payloads may be enabling. If one accepts this logic, then it would be critical to optimize on the orbits 
which can be reached by the different launch providers, while keeping the location as far out of Earth’s 
gravity well as possible.  
 
For cargo missions using solar electric propulsion to get to Mars, the ARRC would also be a logical place 
to hand off to a re-usable SEP tug.  Cargo can be aggregated at the ARRC (if needed) and then pushed out 
to the Martian system using these efficient tugs. This is very analogous to using ships to efficiently 
deliver large amounts of cargo from Christchurch to say McMurdo in Antarctica. These SEP tugs 
themselves can be re-fueled and serviced at the ARRC.  
 
While perhaps not meeting the standard for a true ARRC node as defined herein, it is recognized that low 
Earth orbit (LEO) represents a special location in cisunar space as the “least common denominator” 
access point for space.  Incorporating an in-space logistics transfer capability between LEO and the 
location of the ARRC in HEO/cisunar space could be an extremely valuable service, potentially 
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commercial or international, that would open up participation in Mars exploration to any organization 
who has the ability to access LEO.  Combined with the development of other standards such as 
docking/grappling approaches and standard volumes/dimensions, the use of LEO as a “bus stop” on the 
way to a larger “station” could greatly increase the number of pathways and providers available to get 
materiel into the overall logistics chain. 
 
The ARRC in High Mars Orbit 
 
The ability to efficiently pre-emplace cargo and propellant and to have diversity of supply chain is equally 
important, if not more so, in the Martian system.   
 
Because of the large amounts of cargo that has to be shipped out to the Martian system to support human 
operations and the associated large quantities of propellant needed to do that, most Mars architectures try 
to send as much cargo as possible out via electric propulsion given the greater efficiency of electric 
propulsion over chemical propulsion. Solar electric propulsion is significantly more efficient than 
chemical propulsion but has much lower levels of thrust and therefore longer transit times. An Earth-
based analogy would be sending cargo via ship and people via airplanes. Fundamentally, the goal is to 
keep the size of MTV as small as possible and use less efficient but higher thrust chemical propulsion to 
get the crew there as fast as possible.  
 
There is also a tradeoff between keeping the MTV as small as possible and its capability for keeping the 
crew safe. With an ARRC in high Mars orbit (HMO), the propellant mass problem may be a little easier 
to solve, letting the MTV be a little more robust.  
 
Additionally, for delivering cargo, having multiple entities (commercial or international) delivering 
logistics modules to the ARRC may be enabling. The key point is that the docking adapters on the ARRC 
would support these different types of logistics modules arriving at different times and effectively being 
aggregated in one place awaiting a crew arriving on the faster, but less efficient MTV. We have begun to 
see this capability emerge with the International Space Station where several different types of spacecraft 
have docked with it.  
 
An ARRC in HMO would also function as a safe haven. Key here, from a mission planning standpoint, is 
that we stop thinking of the Earth as the only safe haven. We can over time build up safe havens at other 
nodes to allow us to better handle contingencies. On the outbound leg or while in orbit at Mars, the 
underlying assumption may be that if something goes wrong, we plan to handle it at the ARRC in HMO.  
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With such a safe haven concept, it is not necessary to have equipment and machinery that works 
flawlessly for a typical full Mars mission of 1000-1100 days. So for life support, the equipment does not 
need to be fully closed loop. If the crew experiences a failure and cannot repair it in transit to Mars, they 
can make use of spare parts at the ARRC to accomplish the repair. The utilization of standardized 
modules, for bulk cargo, life support, etc., can offset the need for major tech developments to occur prior 
to a human Mars mission. For example, the need to develop an life support backbone that will survive an 
entire mission duration may be obviated if a “standardized” plug-and-play life support module can be 
substituted if there is a component fault. This concept can be extended for all of the major mission 
elements that would comprise an MTV; the module concept can be extended to either extreme, large or 
small, when trying to determine the standard module(s) configuration. This could range from entire 
redundant hab modules, down to modular individual components. 
 
This overall capability can also be augmented with 3D printing capabilities. While this technology is still 
developing, we need to realize that it has heavy commercial involvement already and that counting on 
significant gains in overall capability by the time we execute the first human Mars mission is a very 
reasonable assumption.  
 
In such an approach, we fundamentally are breaking up a Mars mission into segments where the 
management of the segments and the equipment designs begin to be more like Space Station length 
missions. This, if done aggressively, creatively, but with adequate attention to risk, can substantially 
reduce the overall cost of Mars missions. In other words, we may not need significant advances in all 
systems needed for a MTV; we can start contemplating using systems not too improved over what we use 
already on ISS, with the attendant cost savings in immediate research and development expenses.  
 
Besides being an aggregation point for logistics and safety reasons, having a capability in Mars orbit 
provides other benefits. Crewed sortie missions to one or both of the Martian moons from the aggregation 
point would be enabled depending on the orbit selected. Exploring the moons can achieve science and 
possibly in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) objectives. Tele-operation of rovers, and maybe aircraft, from 
orbit would accelerate the amount of science these assets could perform. The facility, during crewed and 
un-crewed portions, can be a platform for science instruments and experiments. Additionally, an ARRC 
in HMO could act as an integral component of the overall communications network, utilizing the power 
rich infrastructure that is required to support a logistics node/safe haven. Orbital mechanics and mission 
coverage may influence the importance of an ARRC node in the overall communications network, but the 
inclusion of the capability should not be overlooked. 
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A high Mars orbit aggregation point may be not be necessary anymore once the capabilities on the surface 
are completed. By the time a permanent exploration zone is established, the technology for landing large 
payloads directly on the surface of Mars will likely be proven and available for cargo resupply. At this 
point logistics could be delivered directly to the surface of Mars and the orbital aggregation point may be 
used solely for scientific and communication relay purposes. 
 
Establishing a Logistics Node on the Surface of Mars 
 
Ultimately, the goal is to establish a permanent base or Exploration Zone (EZ) on the surface of Mars. In 
many respects, a surface base is akin to the South Pole research station. It is at the end of a very long 
supply chain. It will take some time to build up sufficient infrastructure and logistics for it to become a 
true safe haven for crews.  
 
Furthermore, we understand how to live in space. We do not know how to live on Mars. While Mars may 
look like earth, there are significant hazards there (dust, toxicity of dust, lack of access to resources, 
ubiquity of oxychlorine compounds, potential biological hazards, temperature extremes, etc.), that will 
take time to addressed. Just because Mars looks like Earth, does not mean it is safe like Earth.  
 
It may be that in off nominal situations, the default down mode for some time may to return to the MTV 
docked to an adequately provisioned ARRC.  
 
Having said that, we do envision EZ becoming a robust logistics node in time. We would also envision 
commercial entities and international partners delivering cargo and eventually crews to the base.  
 
Costs Associated with an ARRC 
While an ARRC may be mandatory in HEO/cislunar space, it is not proven yet that an ARRC is required 
in HMO.  Any capability and associated equipment has to be maintained; propellant may also be needed 
to maintain the orbits of these ARRCs. Rendezvousing with a fixed asset will also entail orbital plane 
changes, particularly at Mars with the greater tilt of its polar axis relative to Earth’s, and while such plane 
changes can probably be managed, the actual costs in terms of propellant need to be fully understood.   
 
With an ARRC architecture in place, it may enable individual in-space vehicles to be simpler and have 
fewer redundant systems since the failure of one vehicle carrying supplies would more easily be mitigated 
by other supply vehicles. 	
Summary 
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A robust Mars Aggregation, Refueling, Resupply Capability is a key difference between exploration and 
sustained operations and is vital to risk reduction across the human Mars exploration architecture. There 
is immense value in having a robust logistics supply chain and safe havens for our crews in contingency 
scenarios, offsetting an increase in cost or complexity of the architecture, if there even is an increase. 
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Long Pole 3: Transit Habit and Laboratory 
 
The Long Pole 
 
As we strive to expand our exploration of the solar system with humans, the extreme environment of deep 
space presents challenges to the designing and building a habitat that would take humans safely to and 
from Mars.  The highly successful International Space Station (ISS) has provided a wealth of lessons 
learned from the past 20 years of development and operations experience that can be used to further our 
goals.  The transit habitat specifically will be required to keep four astronauts healthy for up to 500 days, 
provide high-efficiency life support (air and water), have equipment that allows for a crew of four to 
exercise, be fairly autonomous, allow the crew to conduct research during their trip in a limited volume 
and protect them from the harsh radiation of deep space. The transit habitat should also allow for resupply 
and potentially for reuse and refurbishment as well.  These challenges are solvable but require focused 
funding  
 
Statement of Achievability 
 
While there are engineering challenges to designing a reliable deep space transit habitat, the work to date 
on the International Space Station and data from the robotic Mars Program have allowed scientists to 
conclude it is possible to live and work in space for an extended period of time.  To further reduce the 
risks and cost, NASA is developing new technologies in the HEOMD Human Research Program (HRP; 
see long pole 8 in this report) and in the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program in the areas of 
life support, crew health and habitation. Finally, NASA’s NextSTEP-2 studies have shown that there are 
is range of solutions available to support crews in cislunar deep space, a proving ground for longer term 
human exploration of Mars. 
 
While the long-pole itself is transit habitation, there are a number of contributing characteristics that 
contribute to the challenge in the area.  Those challenges are summarized in the list below.  
Radiation protection: long term crew health and safety vs increased mass and volume 
Crew autonomous operations due to communication delays 
Crew health: compact and robust exercise and medical equipment 
Crew activity: the crew needs sustained meaningful activities during the trip 
Vehicle maintenance, including internal- and external-mounted equipment 
Reliable Life Support: serviceable/maintainable with much lower power and volume compared 
to the ISS  
Crew Privacy and Habitable Volume and other human factors (configuration and total volume) 
Logistics and storage: storage of supplies and waste in a limited volume 
Thermal in the range 1AU-1.5 AU 
Reduced power at 1.5 AU: only 43% of available solar power at Mars compared to Earth. 
Navigation 
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Quarantine/Isolation/Privacy Capability  
 
 
Primary challenges to closing long pole 
 
Each of the challenges is listed in the following table, which includes why it is a challenge, what the 
current state of practice is, options for mitigation and recommendations 
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Time to close long pole: Each of these challenges will need to be addressed before sending humans to 
Mars in the 2030s and as such should be demonstrated effectively in cislunar space in the mid-2020s.   
 
Closing long pole requires access to (at a minimum):  Still several days away from Earth, cislunar space is 
the closest available similar environment that would allow for validation of each of the solutions to these 
challenges.  Getting to cislunar space requires a heavy lift launch capability such as the Space Launch 
System (SLS) currently under development by NASA.  
 
Primary Challenge to Achievability  
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The main issue with achievability is available budget and organizational structure. At present, the funding 
to address the long poles in habitation is limited. While there is work on some of them, the current 
funding level is insufficient to be ready for a mission to Mars in the 2030s. Additionally, habitation 
design work within NASA is limited to a small closed team. A private-public partnership arrangement 
with a more open acquisition process that would overlap the goals of government and private industry 
would be mutually beneficial allowing for more innovation to address the challenges and much lower cost 
development.  
 
 
Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
 
Some relevant examples of current long-duration habitat work includes the International Space Station 
(ISS) – prior to that, NASA spent time on the Russian Mir space station – NASA’s Human Research 
Program (including its Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) facility), the University of 
Hawai’i’s Space Exploration Analog and Simulation (Hi-SEAS), the Japanese Controlled Ecological 
Experiment Facility (CEEF), as well as studies funded through NASA’s Next Space Technologies for 
Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP-2). 
 
Trade studies by the NASA teams have identified two alternate habitat configurations, one derived from 
ISS and the alternate derived from SLS.  Both are driven by available manufacturing tooling, which 
determines the outside diameter of the module. The ISS configuration (Figure 1), with its 4.2 m diameter, 
has the principal orientation horizontally for all the crew equipment.  The SLS 8.2 m diameter module 
(Figure 2) is also horizontal, although multi-level. This in contrast with Skylab, which had all the crew 
decks oriented vertically within the habitat shell. 
 
Figure 1: ISS module-derived deep-space habitat 
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The ISS has been a very valuable long-term asset for dealing with long term crew health in a microgravity 
environment, however, the ISS is considerably bigger, is regularly resupplied by ships from the Earth and 
relies heavily on ground controllers to keep it running smoothly. A Mars habitation vehicle will have to 
operate in a much different radiation environment and be further from Earth.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. SLS-derived deep-space habitat 
 
 
 
Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
 
The current strategy is for NASA to develop and fly a deep space habitat to cislunar space.  The 
environment is similar enough to deep space that many of the proposed solutions can be tested in cislunar 
space before sending astronauts on a 30 month journey to Mars.  The minimum success criteria should be 
that all the critical subsystems (eg life support, water recycling) have been operated successfully in the 
deep space environment of cislunar space for at least one Earth year with and without astronauts on-board.  
This is very similar to how they would be operated for an actual Mars mission. 
 
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
 
Public-private partnerships should be exploited to the maximum extent possible.  Open architecture 
developments have repeatedly demonstrated enormous innovation and cost savings over time.  NASA 
could share lessons learned from ISS development and operation while private companies could bring 
clever and less expensive ways of accomplishing the objectives. In short, a public-private partnership for 
the design and eventual build of deep space habitation modules would accomplish this approach. 
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Long Pole 4: Entry, Descent, and Landing: Crew and Cargo Landers 
 
The Long Pole 
 
The EDL long pole for a crewed Mars mission is the selection, development, and qualification of an EDL 
architecture capable of precisely landing payloads over an order of magnitude heavier than present 
capability allows that also fit within possible launch vehicle fairings.  The first long duration (~300 days) 
Mars human surface missions will require delivery of nearly all supplies necessary for survival. Total 
payload estimates are on the order of 80t. It is not feasible to deliver this mass in a single lander. 
Therefore, current concepts divide the total payload into 4 separate 20t units that must be delivered in 
close proximity (~1km) of one another with high precision (<50m) at a single location over several launch 
opportunities to minimize the distance humans must travel to access surface assets.  Current technology 
can only land payloads of approximately 1t within a landing radius of approximately 20km.  We need an 
order-of-magnitude increase in payload capability and a nearly three order-of-magnitude reduction in 
landing radius necessitating new vehicle systems with significantly improved deceleration, payload 
volume, guidance, navigation, control and landing capabilities.  
 
Simply scaling current designs to the larger masses required by human missions requires capsule 
diameters larger than  those that can be accommodated by current or planned launch vehicle fairing 
dimensions. Thus, capable atmospheric entry technologies that can be packaged into a more compact and 
efficient form at launch are being explored.  Similarly, present supersonic parachute technology is near its 
scale limit and cannot be extended to the deceleration of payloads in the mass range required for a human 
mission.  Supersonic retropropulsion is the present descent mode of choice, but very limited Mars descent 
developmental analysis and test has been performed for this technology.  The development and 
qualification of the EDL systems required for human Mars missions will take significant time to complete.  Figure	1:	Fast	Track	to	Mars shows at a top level what it will take to get a human mission to Mars.  
 
 
Statement of Achievability 
 
Although EDL of human class missions for crew and cargo to the surface of Mars represents a significant 
tall pole to future Mars missions, the challenges with this can be mitigated with proper and timely 
decision making, planning, and funding.  As can be seen in Figure	1, it was estimated that approximately 
13 years is required to have landed a human class cargo mission on Mars.  The challenge of landing 
human-scale payload masses on the Martian surface is daunting.  Many of the configurations being 
considered offer key trade-offs in terms of reducing risk, mass, cost and schedule.  The key to achieving 
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human scale EDL is making early architecture decisions to narrow the trade space and proceeding down 
the path of design solutions and testing to verify these solutions.   
 
	
Figure	1:	Fast	Track	to	Mars 
 
Key characteristics of long pole and its challenges 
 
• Primary challenge to closing long pole: Early selection of lander design and EDL architecture in 
the context of the entire mission (Earth launch to Earth return) to allow sufficient testing and data 
for each flight regime.  
 
• Secondary challenges to closing long pole: Techniques to allow pinpoint landing 
 
• Time to close long pole: 13 years 
 
• Closing long pole requires access to (at a minimum): High Earth atmospheric regions simulating 
Mars atmospheric density; precursor mission to Mars surface demonstrating full scale, full system 
EDL prior to human crew flight. 
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Primary Challenge to Achievability: Scale of EDL Human-Class Missions (volume and mass) 
   
The Apollo missions used retropropulsion alone to land on the moon, but when they returned to Earth, 
they used the atmosphere to decelerate.  Use of atmosphere for deceleration is much more practical than 
retropropulsion alone mainly due to the huge mass savings realized by not carrying the additional 
propellant.  Mars is a particularly difficult destination for achieving a soft landing.  Its atmosphere is too 
significant to ignore, but too thin to use the same systems that work at Earth. Further, Mars has a much 
larger gravity well than the moon.  Carrying enough propellant to Mars to allow a retropropulsion only 
approach for even the smallest usable payloads becomes prohibitive.  The problem only gets worse as 
payload masses increase toward human class missions. 
 
An atmospheric EDL system is comprised of several distinct technologies employed in sequence:  1) An 
entry vehicle whose drag removes more than 99 per cent of the vehicle’s kinetic energy, 2) supersonic 
decelerators to reduce the vehicle’s velocity further in preparation for terminal descent, and 3) a landing 
system to provide a soft touchdown.  Current state-of-the-art for EDL at Mars is a rigid blunt aeroshell, 
followed by a supersonically deployed parachute, and then a propulsive system to remove the remaining 
kinetic energy achieving a soft touch down.  At Mars, such a system can land 1-1.5t vehicles with an 
accuracy on the order of a 20 km by 6.5km ellipse. 
 
Recent NASA studies indicate human-scale missions may require payloads between 15t and 40t, 
depending on the architecture selected. Landing precision needs to improve to be able to safely deliver 
multiple payloads within 50m of their target.  And the system must be “human rated”.  NASA’s current 
Mars EDL capability will not meet these requirements.  If a common EDL architecture is assumed for 
cargo and crewed entries, early cargo missions could be used to “human-rate” the system at Mars. 
For the hypersonic phase, rigid blunt bodies have been used for every successful landing on Mars.   
Such entry vehicles must tolerate the high temperatures of hypersonic flight. Increasing the size of the 
heatshield allows for targeting higher altitudes, or delivery of heavier payloads, or both.  Unfortunately, 
the diameter of rigid blunt body heatshields is limited to the diameter of the launch vehicle.  This will not 
be sufficient to decelerate these larger masses nor will the capsule accommodate the required payload 
volume.  Other entry technologies, such as rigid slender aeroshells or deployable/inflatable heatshields to 
allow blunt body diameters beyond the limitations of the launch vehicle shroud, will be required.  
Launching a rigid blunt body aeroshell in a “hammerhead” configuration, making it the launch shroud, is 
possible but poses many aerodynamic, structural and verification difficulties. 
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Supersonically deployed parachutes are not feasible for human-class entry masses.  However, supersonic 
decelerators other than parachutes have been investigated. One of those, supersonic retropropulsion, can 
be employed with any of the hypersonic technologies currently being considered.    Data is needed in the 
flight regimes and pertinent environments to verify its performance.  A current activity that is gathering 
this type of data is the flyback of Falcon 9 boosters by SpaceX. Data from these flights will inform the 
design of future Mars EDL systems. 
 
Our state-of-the-art landing system for Mars, the Sky Crane system used for Curiosity in 2012, and 
baselined for the Mars 2020 mission, does not scale efficiently to human-class missions.  Completely new 
systems, utilizing lander legs, single-stroke airbags, or crushable materials (or some combination of these) 
will be required.  The terminal decent through landing will likely require hazard avoidance and hazard 
tolerance.  Thruster-terrain interactions will also require study as significant material will likely be 
excavated during high mass mission propulsive landings. 
 
EDL technologies can be developed to some degree with ground-based efforts. Though flight testing at 
Earth is required in order to match all design conditions concurrently for a given EDL phase, but they 
cannot be matched at Earth for the entire EDL sequence.  So, end-to-end testing of an entire Mars EDL 
system at Earth is not currently possible.  So we build complex simulations of the vehicle systems to do 
the end-to-end testing.  See Figure	2.  Retiring as much risk at Earth as possible, and then human-rating 
the vehicle system at Mars via the cargo delivery missions required prior to human arrival, is one 
approach.  It does put valuable cargo at risk for the first high mass landing attempt at Mars but that is the 
trade for getting humans to Mars more quickly for less funds. 
 
However, an optimal EDL system may not result in an optimal overall Earth to Mars human mission 
architecture. Therefore, efforts to understand whole mission architectures and early decisions regarding 
engine selection, propellant type, launch vehicle fairing diameter and even in space transportation options 
will have a significant impact and guide EDL architecture decisions.  
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Figure	2:	End-to-End	EDL	Simulation 
 
 
Secondary Challenge to Achievability:  Pinpoint Landing 
 
The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission used a combined aeroshell / supersonic parachute / powered 
descent (subsonic) with a hovering Skycrane to lower the approximately 1t Curiosity rover onto the 
surface.  The landing ellipse achieved through bank angle guidance was 20 km x 6.5 km.  This system 
will also be used for the upcoming Mars 2020 mission, and is likely capable of landing 1.5t of payload. 
 
To minimize the distance humans must travel to access the surface assets, current requirements are to land 
the vehicles within 50 m of a designated target. Due to the unknown interaction between the engines and 
the surface at landing, and based on lunar experience where surface assets were “sandblasted” by debris 
lifted by engines, there is also a requirement for the individual landers to maintain a 1 km separation zone 
from any other landed asset. Surface plume interaction studies are being conducted to see if that 
separation zone can be reduced. Approaches to evaluate more favorable engine orientations at landing and 
the use of surface preparation approaches (i.e. landing pads), are also being considered to reduce or 
eliminate the need for a separation zone. 
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To achieve the secondary challenge of pinpoint landing several advancements are needed. The first is in 
the entry guidance and control approach. Bank angle control used on MSL has an open loop phase during 
reversals that increases landing dispersions. Other control approaches should be considered. Additionally, 
innovative guidance/vehicle integration and mechanisms need to be traded against propellant based 
options that minimize targeting errors (e.g. invest in deep throttling engines vs. developing a movable flap 
system for control). Also, the geometry and flight profile of supersonic retropropulsion trajectories is very 
different from heritage parachute trajectories necessitating the investigation of new landing sensors suites.         
 
 
Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
 
• No launch vehicle exists to launch the payloads needed to support humans on the surface.(EDL 
design and capability is strongly coupled to the diameter of the launch vehicle)  
• Viking heritage EDL technology (parachutes) does not extend to payload masses beyond 2 t. 
(Human scale payloads will be much greater than 2t) 
• Requirements for landing sensors that can enable landing precision within 50 m have not been 
identified. (No lander mission to date has flown with the geometry that a SRP mission will 
require or had such stringent requirements for landing (<50 m) )  
• An architecture strategy has not been selected, and that affects in-space transportation, parking 
orbit, duration on the surface, and delivered payload requirements. (No clear picture of what 
payloads are, how they integrate with the entry system, or how much propellant and control 
authority will be needed to meet landing requirements.) 
 
 
Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
 
Several private industry, academia and government studies are underway to assess various hypersonic 
entry technologies, GN&C strategies, supersonic retropropulsion performance, engine options and 
landing sensors.  All make assumptions regarding the launch vehicle diameter and in space transportation 
options. These are two key factors that can impact the selection of the entry system. Therefore, until a 
decision is made, continued evaluation of the strengths and limitations of various entry configurations 
(capsule, deployable, and mid-L/D) is encouraged.  
The sooner an EDL system downselect can be made and testing of elements at flight regimes of interest 
commences, the sooner the technologies will be available. Efforts to perform a precursor mission to 
demonstrate EDL, long term cryogenic storage, In-Situ Resource Utilization (Oxygen), fission power or 
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other subsystems required for human scale missions are also encouraged to enable a full scale cargo 
lander in the early 2030s. 
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
• Deployable and Mid-L/D entry technologies 
• Use of ISRU to produce Lox for MAV (limits upper bound of landed mass) 
• Guidance algorithms for Direct Force Control  
• ALHAT like landing sensors 
• Aerocapture 
• Landing pad preparation 
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Long Pole 5: Surface Habitat and Reseaarch Laboratory  
 
The Long Pole 
 
The surface habitat and research laboratory facilities will build upon ISS lessons learned, a series of field 
and laboratory tests at NASA Centers, as well as lessons learned and design of the in-space transit habitat 
that should be, at a minimum, designed and likely already flown, if only in a test flight. The surface 
habitat discussed here should be designed to eventually support a crew of six astronauts for a long-
duration mission at the start as opposed to a short stay, with possible allowance for gradually building up 
to longer durations.  The habitat should support multiple visits as an outpost, as opposed to Apollo-style 
landings at multiple sites. We are also assuming that the primary power source and the primary 
communication infrastructure for communication with Earth are both external to or separate from the 
habitat and its design. 
 
This is a long pole partly for the same reason that the in-space habitat is a long pole: while there are many 
components of this complex project that are being assessed independently, there is at present no 
centralized budget and organizational structure to develop it. In addition, there is a tightly coupled 
relationship between the capabilities of the surface habitat and research laboratory and the capabilities of 
other systems (e.g., the lander). For example, total surface mission duration, the degree of ISRU 
dependence, and desired science investigation capabilities will drive total habitat mass that could, in turn, 
become a driving requirement for the lander. But factors unrelated to the habitat (or other payloads), such 
as EDL, could lead to constraints on the lander’s mass delivery capability or payload volume capability, 
which could then become a driving requirement on the surface habitat and laboratory. Because of this 
dilemma, specific choices were made in this assessment. The reader should keep in mind that alternative 
adopted implementations or architectures would lead to different long poles. 
 
Statement of Achievability 
The surface habitat and laboratory will build on experience gained from the development, and possible 
operation, of the transit habitat. Both the transit and surface habitats will build on the 15+ years of 
experience with ISS habitats and laboratory experience, likely 20+ years of experience by the time either 
of these systems are developed, as well as ongoing insight gained from technology developments, such as 
NASA’s NextSTEP-2 and other international and commercial efforts. The experienced 
design/development workforce, established manufacturing base, and cumulative operational experience 
will provide the best possible foundation to extend this capability to the surface of Mars. But the specific 
design and development of the surface habitat and laboratory will still face challenges unique to this 
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portion of a human Mars mission, influenced predominantly by landing constraints, interactions with 
other surface assets, and Mars environmental effects. 
 
Challenges to closing long pole: 
• Surface habitability: defined as a system designed such that the small crew can live comfortably 
and accomplish all of the research and exploration tasks assigned to the mission, as well recover 
from unexpected occurances. 
• Systems availability: defined as the fraction of time that a system is operational as compared to 
the total time that it is deployed 
• Mitigating detrimental Martian natural surface environmental effects, while leveraging beneficial 
effects, and predicting potential environmental changes due to human presence 
• Definition of the fundamental and applied research objectives to be carried out on the Martian 
surface, along with the systems and operations needed to achieve them 
• Extended periods of dormancy followed by successful startup 
• Surface operations 
• Close coordination with lander and entry/descent/landing (EDL) design 
• Food: providing food that remains nutritional after a very long shelf life 
 
When discussing the challenges faced by the surface habitat and laboratory, this group considered the 
relative magnitude of the challenge presented by the Environmental Control and Life Support System 
(ECLSS) compared with the items listed above. The consensus was that, although a critical component of 
the surface habitat and laboratory system, several factors were identified indicating that ECLSS would not 
be as daunting as other challenges identified in this section. These other factors included: (1) the 
International Space Station (ISS) ECLSS is already at roughly 50% recovery of O2 from CO2 and roughly 
75% recovery of H2O6, recognizing that this performance is likely to improve even more before the ISS is 
decommissioned; (2) ISS ECLSS reliability numbers are also relatively high and will continue to improve 
through end-of-life, though it was recognized that these numbers are probably not yet good enough for a 
Mars mission; (3) ECLSS technology development work is going on now in NASA’s NextSTEP activity, 
both for the habitat modules and separately for ECLSS itself; and (4) by the time the surface module is in 
development, the transit habitat should have been built and may have been operating, experience from 
which will feed directly into the surface habitat development. Given these factors, this group decided that 
a usable form of ECLSS would be a low risk development item for early Mars surface missions. This 
does not mean that more advanced forms of ECLSS, such as bioregenerative types (e.g., incorporating 
crop growth), would not be mature enough for early Mars surface missions. However, these advanced 																																																								6	Robyn Gatens (NASA HQ HEOMD ISS Division), personal communication	
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forms of ECLSS were not absolutely required for initial Mars surface missions, although potential Mars 
surface environmental impacts are uncertain at this time and are still being assessed. 
 
Time to close long pole: There are several areas of research currently under study by NASA’s Human 
Research Program (HRP; long pole 8 in this report) that will affect the detailed design of the surface 
habitat and research laboratory. Once these HRP issues are resolved or understood to an acceptable level 
of risk, it is our assessment that surface habitation will require a minimum of five years for 
design/development/test (an aggressive timeline that accepts high levels of risk for cost, schedule and 
achieving mission objectives) to as much as 16 years (a more traditional timeline that that allows for 
resolution of issues described below). 
 
Closing long pole requires access to (at a minimum) the following venues for development and test: Earth 
surface 
 
Primary Challenge to Achievability: Surface habitability (architecture for livability and usability) 
 The concept of surface habitability incorporates multiple architectural aspects within the habitat that are 
specifically designed for its livability and usability. This includes (a) adequate volume for the size of the 
crew and their supplies (e.g. crew consumables, supplies, commodities buffer (e.g., water, gases, etc.), 
spares), (b) the interior layouts of the space within the habitat, (c) design of the individual workstations 
throughout (including those research disciplines that are included within the habitat, and their level of 
functionality), (d) design of lighting architecture to augment the natural environment, and (e) the hatch 
size and docking system to other modules or transport vehicles. Additionally, this includes important 
practical techniques such as repair techniques and tools. 
  
Why this Tall Pole is Challenging 
 
Gap: We have no validation that results of studies of short duration (several weeks to several months) 
habitation tests extrapolate to a 1000-day test or mission 
• There is limited human expertise in long-duration habitation in remote locations: there is no practical 
study to predict the volumes, layouts, tools, etc. needed for this type of excursion 
• Some close-analogs exist (e.g. Arctic and Antarctic stations, submarines, small surface 
vessels, aircraft), but there are many differences between those environments and Mars 
surface habitats 
• Example: Submarines – small crew quarters, but large crew size and 
numerous/diverse facilities, plus periodic surfacing and ocean access 
	 44	
• Example: Arctic and Antarctic stations had deep isolation, although evacuation 
possible and access to large surface areas outside habitat 
• Example: ISS had similar mission durations, although greater breadth of science 
functionality and <1 day evacuation to Earth plus resupply during crew expedition 
• Human behavior is non-deterministic and difficult to predict: different crew makeups can experience 
the same environments differently  
• Historically, each space flight mission has been a custom solution for the vehicles used. 
• Largely unexplored challenge will be months-long voyages that will require significant activities, 
attractive challenges, substantial accommodation for privacy, isolation, and/or quarantine. 
 
Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
 
Some examples of current long-duration habitat studies include the International Space Station , NASA’s 
Human Research Program (including its Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) facility), the 
University of Hawai’i’s Hawai'i Space Exploration Analog and Simulation (Hi-SEAS), the Japanese 
Controlled Ecological Experiment Facility (CEEF), as well as studies funded through NASA’s Next 
Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP-2). 
 
The challenge with these current studies is that there is no agreed-upon relationship that can be used to 
scale them up to a size relevant for a martian surface habitat design for either different crew sizes or 
longer mission durations. In order to properly close this challenge, a representative analog of the mission 
would need to be performed that would address issues such as maintenance, medical, egress, and 
food/consumption, which could be somewhat independent of research science goals and operations. 
Although a “good-enough” surface habitat and laboratory design may be possible from our understanding 
today, or it may be possible to build a “modular” habitat system that incorporates aspects of testing, at 
this stage, more work needs to be done in order to really address the challenge of surface habitability. 
 
Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
 
• Perform psychological studies with focus on limited volume and long duration 
• Study modular habitat design and standard interfaces 
• Test intermediate-length duration isolation 
• Evaluate options to address environmental impacts 
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The primary strategy for closing the long pole would be to conduct mission simulations with relevant 
Mars mission durations in multiple existing and future analog facilities to identify trends or relationships 
impacting Mars surface habitat design with respect to volume, layout, workstation design, crew size, 
hatch size and docking system, mission objective (science, ISRU, technology testing, robotics, etc.) 
disciplines included, and repair techniques and tools. 
Key Test Elements 
• Supportability (combining maintenance, repair, and fabrication) 
• Planned and unplanned activity (habitat, spacesuits, other surface elements) 
• Time-critical subsystem repairs 
• Component versus replacement-unit sparing; material recycling/recovery versus raw 
material for on-site manufacturing 
• Preventative and Emergency Medical Care 
• Consumables mass/volume/access implications 
• Long term recovery, including possible isolation and quarantine 
• Long-Term Habitation 
• Habitat quality 
• Crew psychology/teaming 
• Logistics translations, including across hatches 
• Transitions across habitable elements: lander, habitat, rover 
• Meaningful Crew Work 
• Degree of crew scheduling authority/mission design 
• Manpower assessment 
• Work disciplines: science, ISRU, technology testing, robotics, etc.) 
• Quality and quantity of work achieved in each domain 
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
• Allowing for higher risk 
• Design/build/test methodology (field tests/analogs) 
• Repurposing items: dual-use items and logistics-to-living concepts, including trash 
• Continuing mission simulations in even-more realistic simulated environments 
• Leveraging commercial capabilities 
 
Secondary Challenge to Achievability: Systems Availability 
The concept of availability as used here is intimately tied to the system reliability concept of operation 
(CONOPS), and maintainability (preventative and corrective). This means that a system, in this case the 
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surface habitat and research laboratory, is functioning properly when needed and that availability is 
achieved through a combination of highly reliable subsystems/components and a reasonable level of 
planned maintenance. System availability is formally defined7 as the fraction of time that a system is 
operational as compared to the total time that it is deployed. That is, 100% system availability means that 
a system is operational for the entirety of a mission. Conversely, 50% system availability means that it is 
only operational half the time. Note that operational does not necessarily mean “running”: a system can 
be operational but not “ON”. The Mars surface habitat and research laboratory is currently envisioned to 
be a facility used by multiple crews over the course of a Mars surface exploration campaign. This implies 
a useful lifetime for this facility that is comparable to that of the ISS. But logistical support, in this case in 
the form of spare parts, will be much more expensive to provide and there will be very few opportunities 
deliver these spare parts. Planned (or unanticipated) maintenance is facilitated by the presence of a crew, 
although only to the degree that they have the spare/replacement components needed. 
 
Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole 
 
Improvements in the current level of availability for key habitat systems as exemplified by the ISS are 
readily apparent. Continued operation of the ISS, as well as technology development efforts such as 
NASA’s NextSTEP, will lead to improvements that will be incorporated into both the transit habitat and 
the surface habitat and laboratory. Extended duration simulations identified above for the habitability 
challenge will incorporate availability testing and validation, in many cases focused specifically on those 
areas of emphasis identified for habitability. Some specific examples include: 
 
- Long-life testing of all hardware to characterize mean time between failure (MTBF), failure 
modes, and logistics demands 
- High-fidelity tracking of ISS maintenance and logistics in the ISS Maintenance Analysis Data Set 
(MADS) 
- 3D printing in zero-g experiments on the ISS, using 3D printers and material recyclers (for 
example, systems developed and flown by Made In Space, Inc.; see www.madeinspace.us) and 
their adapted use in 0.38 g. 
- Flight of the Mars Oxygen ISRU Experiment (MOXIE) on the planned Mars 2020 rover to 
characterize performance of a 1% scale ISRU system in the Martian environment 
																																																								7	Federal Standard 1037C Telecommunications: Glossary of Telecommunication Terms, August 
1996. 	
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- Lifecycle testing of exploration class ECLS systems on the ISS (e.g., CO2 and Moisture Removal 
Amine Swingbed (CAMRAS) for the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion MPCV). Note 
that CAMRAS is based on similar technology used on the next generation Portable Life Support 
System. 
 
Innovative Strategies to Close the Secondary Long Poles 
 
• Continuing mission simulations in increasingly realistic simulated environments 
• Continued lifecycle testing of hardware under operational conditions and in relevant operating 
environments to characterize MTBF, spare parts demands, and repair times to enable trades between 
spare parts mass and level of repair and, hence, crew time and required diagnostic equipment and 
tooling for each system 
• Investigate potential of material recovery from failed parts to begin closing the “material loop” where 
the material from yesterday’s failed component can be recovered and manufactured in situ into 
today’s spare part. 
• Investigate opportunities for system redesign that takes advantage of the benefits of in-situ 
manufacturing (ISM). For example, designing components that use lighter materials as ISM means 
that they no longer need to withstand launch loads and can hence be lighter. Similarly, investigate 
opportunities for system redesign with materials that are amenable to material recycling and ISM. 
• Investigate opportunities for commonality in component design and material across the system to take 
advantage of either common parts and/or common ISM and material recovery opportunities. This 
may potential lead to a more robust system, with higher system availability, at a lower total system 
mass.	
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Figure 1 – MSFC Advanced Concept Office deep space habitat 
 
 
  
Major Challenges:
Difﬁcult problems that need to be 
addressed before the ﬁrst human 
mission and are typically 
independent of overall architecture 
or mission design.
• Systems Availability 
• Mitigating Martian Natural 
Surface Environment 
• Fundamental and Applied 
Research (environment 
monitoring, ISRU processing 
and sample handling) 
• Surface Habitability
• Dormancy and Startup
Medium Challenges:
Issues that must be addressed 
before the ﬁrst mission but cannot 
be addressed before a speciﬁc 
architecture and/or system/element 
design has been selected.
• Surface Operations (incl. EVAs, 
docking, repair and system 
architecture)
• Fundamental and Applied 
Research (lab design)
• Close Coordination with Lander 
and EDL design (habitat concepts 
and integration into the lander, 
early crew operations)
• Food (viability vs. shelf life)
Minor Challenges:
Issues that are not as important as 
above items or issues that can be 
deferred until after the ﬁrst human 
mission.
• Surface Operations (base 
layout)
• Habitat Packaging (use of 
inflatables, aluminum and/or 
composites)
• Ability to (Easily) Upgrade 
Systems Over Habitat Lifetime 
(e.g., Hubble OpsCon)
• Fundamental and Applied 
Research (equipment needed 
for surface investigations)
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Long Pole 6: Mars Surface Power 
 
The Long Pole 
 
There are many “long poles” that must be overcome in order to successfully land humans on Mars. To 
keep the astronauts alive and well, and all of their necessary equipment functioning for the time periods 
involved in extended stay missions, the generation of sufficient and dependable power on the Martian 
surface is a critical need. As stated in the critically acclaimed movie, Apollo 13, “Power is everything”. 
 
Surface power needs for human Mars missions will require large-scale power generation, far larger than is 
currently required for robotic missions. Instead of power measured in mere watts, human missions will 
require supplying tens of kilowatts of power, with power systems that can initially be deployed 
robotically and that will remain functional for multiple crew campaigns. Overcoming the Mars surface 
power “long pole” involves the development and/or scaling up of (1) deployable solar arrays with energy 
storage, (2) compact fission reactors, and/or (3) radioisotope power systems (RPS). 
 
Statement of Achievability 
 
Current and/or under development solar electric propulsion (SEP) solar array technology may be 
adaptable for use on the Martian surface (e.g., the Megaflex Solar Array or the Roll-out Solar Array). In 
addition, there is potential to leverage current terrestrial investments in lightweight batteries (e.g., lithium-
ion) that would provide the necessary energy storage capability during periods when the solar arrays are 
offline entirely or are otherwise operating at less than peak efficiency, such as during nighttime or due to 
dust storms.  
 
There are also promising prospects for the development of small, affordable fission reactors, using 
Kilopower technology (see below). Such a system could be used at any location on the Mars surface and 
provide continuous day/night power at a sufficient scale for human missions. Furthermore, past successes 
of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) on Mars, such as in the Viking missions and in the Mars 
Science Laboratory’s Curiosity rover, as well as solar power (Pathfinder, Mars Exploration Rover's Spirit 
and Opportunity, and Phoenix) also speak to the possibility of scaling up these technologies to more 
robust power levels.  
 
Challenges to Closing the Mars Surface Power Long Pole 
There is no current off-the-shelf power solution available at sufficient scale that can operate for long 
durations in the Martian environment. Current RTGs, for example, are limited to an output of 
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approximately 100 watts. Solar Photovoltaic (PV) systems are adversely impacted by reduced solar flux, 
by dust storms, by seasonal changes, and by non-equatorial latitudes. There are also other environmental 
factors that would have to be taken into consideration, such as Mars’ carbon dioxide atmosphere, 0.38 
gravity, dust, wind, diurnal cycle, and surface temperature extremes (-140 C to 35 C). The current lack of 
availability of Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) would have to be addressed for the use of larger radioisotope 
power systems (RPS) on Mars. 
 
Closing the Mars Surface Power “Long Pole” Requires Access to the Martian Surface 
 
Because the equipment and machinery that will be needed for surface power is so critical to mission 
success, and has never been tested under the harsh conditions that exist on the Martian surface, closing 
this particular long pole will require extensive testing including Mars simulated environmental tests on 
Earth and under actual conditions, that is, on the Martian surface. 
 
Primary Challenge to Achievability 
 
Accelerated development of Kilopower technology for Mars surface operations is needed. In addition, 
studies must be undertaken to examine the adaptability of SEP arrays designed to operate in-space to the 
conditions that exist on the Martian surface. Finally, the potential for scaling up of RPS output to 
kilowatt-class must also be determined, including the impact on Pu-238 fuel production. 
 
Other Design Considerations 
 
Mars surface power requirements for expanded robotic systems and human habitation are not well-
defined at present. For example, power requirements for in-situ production may be significant. 
 
In order to generate the same power on Mars as on the Earth, a solar array would have to be three to four 
times larger in area. In addition, dust storms are frequent and can develop anywhere on Mars at any time, 
and landings on the surface will produce dust plumes that may damage nearby solar arrays and radiator 
surfaces. Dust particles will obscure the Sun for extended periods of time, thus requiring backup power 
for PV arrays. 
 
Nuclear power systems offer performance advantages, although have unique safety and policy issues 
including those related to launch. A cold reactor, however, presents minimal risk to the public if the fuel 
is dispersed during a launch accident. Radioactivity is an issue only after the reactor is turned on, which 
would not occur until the reactor is safely away from the Earth. Nuclear reactor shielding mass could be 
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significant and will be dependent on proximity of crew and duration of stay; the use of in-situ materials 
for shielding may be a possible solution to reduce the delivered mass. 
 
Multiple, distributed landing sites, and multiple, time-phased crew campaigns will complicate the power 
distribution network: A large, centralized power station may have to be oversized for initial use and 
require long-distance cabling to connect loads. On the other hand, a distributed power architecture may 
require the delivery of many, smaller power modules with greater complexity of operations. There is also 
a theoretical potential for power beaming for surface-to-surface power transmission (instead of cabling) 
or orbit-to-surface, via laser or microwave. 
 
Time to Close the Mars Surface Power Long Pole 
 
A notional development approach for Mars surface power is shown in Figure 1.  Parallel development of 
solar and nuclear technology options is required for the next ~3-5 years to support informed decisions on 
a preferred flight system approach, followed by a full-scale engineering unit design/fabrication/test in a 
Mars simulated environment in the next ~6-8 years. A full-scale power module flight demonstration on a 
robotic Mars lander in the next ~9-10 years could provide significant risk reduction for later human 
systems. Following the robotic demonstration, continued development of human-rated flight systems 
would be required in order to support human missions to Mars in the 2030s. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mars Surface Power Development Timeline 
 
The time to close this long pole would be approximately 8-10 years for solar and/or RPSs and 
approximately 10-12 years for nuclear fission. 
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DISCUSSION 
A. Solar and RPS: 
 
 1.  Overview of the Challenge:  
Solar-based power architectures may require a combination of PV arrays, energy storage, and RPS for 
reliable power generation. Large Mars surface PV arrays could be derived from SEP or Orion systems, 
modified for use under martian g-loads, wind, and insolation. For example, landing and take-off dust 
plumes could impact array design and concept of operations. In addition, the latitude of the landing site 
will impact the daylight period, and the season (aphelion as opposed to perihelion) will impact the 
available solar flux. Lightweight batteries or regenerative fuel cells (RFC) will be needed for night power. 
Unfortunately, the projected Pu-238 supply under current production scenarios would be insufficient to 
support large-scale RPS use for both human Mars missions and robotic science. However, a combination 
of dynamic conversion and production scale-up could address this issue. 
 
 2.   Power Requirements, and Advantages of this Option  
 
Human missions are expected to require 30 to 40 kW of reliable power for pre-crew in-situ resource 
utilization (ISRU) propellant production and post-landing crew operations, possibly over multiple crew 
campaigns. Combined power systems must provide power throughout the day-night cycle on the surface, 
including dust storms. Even if ISRU is not utilized to make return propellant, the Mars Ascent Vehicle 
(MAV) keep-alive alone requires 4 to 7 kW. RPS can provide up to several kW, and enhance operational 
flexibility with safe human proximity operations (e.g., rover power) and possibly, heat for the habitat or 
ISRU. 
 
Solar PV and energy storage would provide a mass and cost-effective surface power solution with flexible 
multi-role architecture, one that could be robotically installed/repurposed, with flexible use, and one that 
would be immune to terrain variance. The dust environment (periodic dust storms, daily build-up) is, 
however, a major driver. Advanced energy storage solutions would also be required. 
 
 3.   Current State of the Art: 
 
A human-scale solar/RPS Mars power architecture has a strong link to prior robotic missions with 
relevant state-of-the-art (SOA) systems shown in Figure 2.  Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) Spirit and 
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Opportunity, and the Phoenix Lander, used PV arrays and batteries on Mars. Mars Science Laboratory's 
Curiosity rover and the Viking Landers used RPS. 
 
   
Figure 2. Mars SOA Power Examples: MER, Phoenix, and Curiosity 
 
 4.  Why is it Not Sufficient to Use Current State of the Art? 
 
Solar arrays and rechargeable energy storage must be sized for 30-40 kW on Mars and designed for the 
Mars environment. Larger, dynamic RPS must be developed to minimize Pu-238 load, and Pu-238 
production must be scaled up from <1 kg yr-1 as currently planned to 5 kg yr-1. 
 
 5.   What is Currently Being Done to Close this Long Pole? 
  
NASA's SEP effort seeks to develop large-scale in-space arrays.  The Space Technology Mission 
Directorate (STMD) Game Changing Development (GCD)'s Advanced Energy Storage Systems (AESS) 
Project is developing high energy-density batteries.  STMD/GCD has also initiated a Solar Array With 
Storage (SAWS) Seedling Study for Mars-specific PV arrays (possibly adapted from SEP) and RFCs. The 
RPS Program is developing advanced dynamic power conversion, and the Department of Energy (DOE) 
is funded to produce ~1 kg yr-1 of Pu-238.   
 
6.   What is the Minimum Success Criteria?  
 
A combined PV array and energy storage system suitable for Mars surface environment, producing up to 
40 kW of electrical power, with RPS for emergency backup and keep-alive, is required. 
 
 7.   Other Efforts to Close This Long Pole (Other than NASA) 
 
Commercial interests are driving high W-hr-kg-1 energy storage for aviation and automotive applications.  
Large photovoltaic arrays are being developed for SEP and commercial space applications, as well as for 
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terrestrial use. ARPA-e is developing kilowatt-class power conversion for residential combined heat and 
power (CHP) applications. These efforts might be adapted/leveraged for the Humans to Mars campaign. 
 
 8.  Creative Ideas That Might Help to Reduce the Length of this Long Pole 
 
Smaller, modular PV arrays could be deployed from landers and delivered on multiple landers for gradual 
power buildup. RFC energy storage could use ISRU reactants and share ISRU components. The DOE is 
considering alternative Np-237 target designs and commercial fuel production options that could allow 
easier scale-up to 5kg/y Pu-238. 
 
 9.  Commonality with another Long Pole 
 
SEP vehicles and the in-space habitation module require large-scale solar arrays.  Kilopower fission 
technology requires dynamic power conversion. 
 
           10.  Other Relevant Factors 
 
High-capacity power management and distribution (PMAD) systems are needed to connect the distributed 
landing sites and integrate the multiple, diverse power generation sources, with suitable safety and fault 
tolerance for human missions. 
 
          11. Access and Time for Closure 
 
This long pole requires access to the martian surface in order to test out the equipment/machinery under 
the harsh conditions that they will be subjected to on Mars. This could be accomplished through a Mars 
surface robotic lander mission to demonstrate large-scale deployable solar arrays with sufficient night-
time energy storage, and possibly, a kilowatt-class RPS. It is estimated that the solar PV/RPS long pole 
can be closed within the next 8-10 years. 
 
          12.  Additional Information:  
 
Rucker, M.A., et. al., "Solar vs. Fission Surface Power for Mars", AIAA 2016-5452, AIAA SPACE 2016, 
SPACE Conference and Exposition, 2016.  
Hibbard, K., et. al., “Stirling to Flight Initiative”, IEEE AERO.2016.7500818, 2016 IEEE Aerospace 
Conference, March 5-12, 2016. 
 
	 55	
 
 
B.   Nuclear Fission 
 
 1.   Overview of the Challenge: 
 
Due to the power levels required, day-night cycle on the surface, dust storms, and the low solar flux at 
Mars, nuclear fission is an attractive power option that would offer global Mars access. For human Mars 
missions, this would require the development and deployment of compact, human-rated fission surface 
power systems in the 10 kW-class that are suitable for the Mars environment. Through the use of multiple 
power modules, these systems could provide 30 to 40 kW of power for surface operations, as shown in 
Figure 3. A modular system that can be autonomously deployed, remotely started, and turned 
off/transported/turned back on would also enhance operational flexibility and allow a greater exploration 
range. A key first step is a low-cost nuclear ground test of a prototype reactor, which is slated to occur 
under the STMD/GCD Kilopower Project in 2017. Dynamic conversion scale-up, reactor heat pipe 
integration, and launch safety certification are the primary challenges to be resolved after the reactor 
prototype test. Planetary protection must also be considered in the design process, possibly through the 
use of thermal insulation to prevent local surface heating.  
 
 
Figure 3. Multiple Fission Power Units Deployed on Martian Surface 
 
 2.   Power Requirements, and Advantages of this Option  
 
Human missions are expected to require 30 to 40 kW of reliable power for pre-crew ISRU propellant 
production and post-landing crew operations, possibly over multiple crew campaigns. Combined power 
systems must provide power throughout the day-night cycle on the surface, including dust storms. Even if 
ISRU is not used, the Mars Ascent Vehicle keep-alive alone requires 4 to 7 kW. 
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Nuclear fission reactors can be deployed at any Martian latitude including locations near the poles where 
water is present. They can also operate continuously, including during the nighttime and during dust 
storms. The reactor has an extremely long life due to the low fuel burnup, and the power system can be 
designed for many years of reliable operation, without crew interaction, using automated control. 
 
Fission reactors provide a very compact energy source: a 10 kW reactor core is about 15 cm in diameter 
and about 28 cm tall. At this small size, the reactor thermal energy can be delivered to the power 
conversion equipment using passive heat pipes. The enriched-uranium fuel (core) can be made in advance 
and stored until needed without any performance decay. 
 
 3.   Current State of the Art 
 
Previous missions have been one-way robotic missions, requiring relatively low power levels achievable 
with solar arrays and batteries or radioisotope power systems. Nuclear submarines use a pressurized-water 
reactor that is not applicable for space use. The only U.S. reactor flown in space (SNAP-10A) was 
discontinued in the late 1960s.  Other space reactor projects (e.g., SP-100, Prometheus) were never 
completed due to cost and/or technical difficulty. 
 
 4.   Why is it Not Sufficient to Use Current State of the Art? 
 
Solar arrays with energy storage may not scale to the power levels needed for human missions, and RPS 
are probably limited to about 1 kW, whereas nuclear fission reactors do not have such limitations. Space 
reactors derived from shipboard nuclear systems may seem like a logical path. However, naval reactors 
are not relevant to space due to their large size and low operating temperature. 
 
 5.   What is Currently Being Done to Close this Long Pole?  
 
As part of the STMD/Game Changing Development Program, the Kilopower Project will perform a 
nuclear-heated reactor test at the Nevada Test Site in 2017, establishing TRL 5 for small fission space 
reactors as shown in Figure 4. The next phase is Kilopower II Engineering Development Unit and 
simulated Mars environment testing. The commonality between Kilopower and nuclear thermal 
propulsion reactor development could reduce the combined overall cost.  
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Figure 4. Kilopower Reactor Prototype Test 
 
 6.   What is the Minimum Success Criteria?  
 
A fission reactor compatible with the Mars surface environment and capable of producing up to 10 kW, 
that can be integrated with multiple lmodules to provide 40 kW total, is required. 
 
 7.   Other Efforts to Close This Long Pole (Other Than NASA) 
 
The DOE is developing Small Modular Reactors for terrestrial applications, but their large size (10s of 
MW) is too big for currently foreseeable Mars missions. The Department of Defense (DOD) is exploring 
small reactors in the 100 kW to 1 MW class for forward operating bases and unmanned underwater 
vehicle applications. These systems may have some commonality with Mars surface reactors. 
 
 8.   Creative Ideas That Might Help to Reduce the Length of this Long Pole 
 
The fission power unit could be integrated with ISRU to provide both electricity and heat, with thermal 
energy supplied at either 600°C (reactor heat) or 100°C (waste heat).  Fission reactors could use Low 
Enriched Uranium (LEU) rather than High Enriched Uranium (HEU) as a means to reduce security costs 
during launch processing, but the LEU systems would have significantly higher mass. 
 
 9.   Commonality with another Long Pole 
 
Nuclear thermal propulsion could use common infrastructure (e.g., test facilities), engineering practices 
(e.g. modeling, materials handing), and components (e.g., neutron reflectors, shielding, control drive 
motors).  Dynamic power conversion technology supports both fission and RPS. 
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          10.   Other Relevant Factors 
 
High-capacity power management and distribution (PMAD) systems are needed to connect the distributed 
landing sites and integrate the multiple power generation sources, with suitable safety and fault tolerance 
for human missions.  Fission systems also introduce the need for radiation shielding and radiation-
hardened electronics near the reactor.  Launch certification process will require combination of analysis 
and testing to assure launch safety and prevention of inadvertent reactor criticality during a launch failure. 
 
          11.  Access and Time for Closure 
 
This long pole requires access to the Martian surface in order to test out the equipment/machinery under 
the harsh conditions that they will be subjected to on Mars. This could be accomplished through a Mars 
surface robotic lander mission to demonstrate the Kilopower design, possibly in combination with an 
ISRU plant. It is estimated that the nuclear fission long pole can be closed within the next 10-12 years. 
 
          12.   Additional Information:  
 
Rucker, M.A., et. al., "Solar vs. Fission Surface Power for  Mars", AIAA 2016-5452, AIAA SPACE 2016, 
SPACE Conference and Exposition, 2016. 
 
Mason, L., et. al., “Kilowatt-Class Fission Power Systems for Science and Human Precursor Missions 
NASA/TM-2013-216541. 
 
Gibson, M, et. al., “Development of NASA’s Small Fission Power System for Science and Human 
Exploration.” NASA/TM-2015-218460,  
 
SUMMARY 
 
Mars surface power requirements for human-scale missions (10s of kW) presents a major development 
challenge or Long Pole. The Mars environment, as well as distributed, time-phased landing sites, pose 
significant challenges to surface power architectures. Although no off-the-shelf solutions currently exist, 
there are several promising options. These include Solar PV with energy storage or nuclear fission. 
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The Solar PV option could leverage SEP investments. The Nuclear Fission option will be better 
understood after the Kilopower nuclear test in Nevada in 2017. RPS is well-suited for low power (less 
than 1 kW) emergency backup. 
 
Technology gaps can be closed with focused, sustained investments. The STMD/GCD Program provides 
a good starting point with Kilopower and SAWS. Funding augmentation is needed, however, to accelerate 
technology maturation to allow informed decisions on flight system approach, and a Mars-simulated 
environment test, followed by an actual environment test, is crucial for technology validation. A mid/late 
2020s robotic surface demonstration of ISRU/power is highly desirable in order to reduce risk for human 
missions. In addition, work must begin in the very near term, without delay, in order to ensure technology 
readiness for human landings in the 2030s. 
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Long Pole 7: Mars Ascent Vehicle 
 
The Long Pole 
 
Round-trip missions from the Earth, to the surface of Mars, and back will require overcoming a number 
significant challenges.  Perhaps one of the greatest challenges is that of ascending off the surface of Mars 
to return the crew to their transportation system for return to Earth.  There have been multiple mission, 
architecture, and system concept studies conducted over the past several decades and each of these studies 
have helped formulate a set of key characteristics for the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) including: 
 
• Typical Mars architectures are designed with the MAV serving as an unoccupied payload with 
periods of long dormancy.  These periods of dormancy include the transit to Mars, loiter in Mars 
orbit, landing on the surface, operations on the surface prior to and during exploration on the 
surface by the crew prior to the final active ascent from the surface to orbit.  This dormant 
duration is typically measured in years of operation. 
• Operation in various environments including launch, deep-space transit, entry, landing, surface, 
and ascent. 
• The MAV must be capable of operating in the various remote environments and performing as 
needed with limited maintenance and repair capabilities by the flight crew. 
• Ascent to Mars orbit requires fairly significant change in velocity to achieve orbital conditions, 
typically 4-6 km s-1 depending on the chosen rendezvous orbit, which results in a large propellant 
load. 
• The MAV may utilize cryogenic propellants to improve performance (reduce the propellant load) 
as well as enable the use of propellants generated in-situ at Mars. 
• The MAV must provide the ability to support multiple crew members (typically 4-6) through 
multiple operational phases (ingress, egress, high acceleration, docking, etc.). 
• As one part of a multi-part systems-of-systems architecture, the MAV must have the ability to 
integrate with multiple separate assets of the overall Mars architecture including items such as 
power systems, propellant production, and crew ingress including ensuring compliance with 
planetary protection protocols. 
• In order to reduce development as well as recurring costs, it is desired to drive commonality of 
the MAV with other Mars architecture elements (e.g., propulsion, propellant choices, power 
systems, crew support systems, etc.). 
1.1. Statement of Achievability 
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It was the consensus of the MAV team that although ascent from the surface of Mars represents a 
significant tall pole to future Mars missions, the challenges can be mitigated with proper and timely 
decision making, planning, and funding.  The team concluded that the efforts required to ensure that the 
integrated system will perform as needed represents the primary challenge for Mars ascent.  As can be 
seen in Figure , we estimated that approximately 13 years may be required to close the set of integrated 
MAV long poles.  This time includes approximately six years for the development and testing of the 
integrated system and is preceded by approximately seven years of effort associated with the secondary 
tall poles including cryogenic fluid management, engine development and crew systems (see discussion 
below).  As part of the deliberations of the MAV team, it was determined that most of the integrated 
testing of the system can be achieved on Earth, but testing of the cryogenic fluid management system will 
require access to low-Earth orbit in order to perform long-term testing in the space environment. 
  
 
Figure 1  MAV Integrated Schedule 
1.2. Primary Challenge:  MAV Integrated System 
1.2.1. Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
Although there is an established experience base of crew launch from the Earth, the unique characteristics 
of ascent from a planetary body represent a significant challenge for human space flight.  Unlike crew 
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launches from Earth, where the support staff can easily number in the thousands, the crew on the surface 
of Mars will be alone with limited access to maintenance tools, facilities, and information from the team 
on Earth.  The current state-of-the-art for human ascent from a planetary body is limited to the six Apollo 
missions.  As can be seen in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1, the previous lunar Apollo missions provide some foundation for future Mars missions, the 
magnitude of differences illustrate significant challenges ahead.  Most of these challenges for the MAV 
are associated with the unavoidable long-duration remoteness of Mars missions. 
1.2.2. Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
It was a consensus of the MAV team that key impediments to closing the integrated system long pole 
include those associated with performing key technical trade studies and making and maintaining 
decisions associated with those trades.  Multiple critical decisions are required first to define the overall 
architecture operational concept, functions, and performance requirements including the mission 
architecture rendezvous orbit, the need for and availability of aborts during descent, reliance on in situ 
resource utilization (ISRU), propellant type, and surface operational concepts, before efforts on closing 
the MAV tall poles can be made.  All of the decisions are critical for defining the MAV in the overall 
system-of-system architecture, but those decisions impact identified secondary tall poles as well (Figure 
2).  For instance, depending on final decisions such as mission payload size, crew size, and mission 
architecture, the utility and strategic implications of hypergolic fuels as a fallback solution from ISRU-
enabling cryogenic propellants cannot be determined.  Adequate progress cannot be made until key 
architecture decisions are made and the necessary test and verification plan is developed. 
1.2.3. Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
A significant challenge to mitigating the risks associated with the MAV long pole is uncertainty in the 
overall Mars architecture.  There are numerous integrated architecture issues related to the MAV that 
require further definition and decision to narrow the trade space and enable meaningful advancement.  It 
is key that NASA management establish and implement a focused decision making process for moving 
the Mars architecture, including the MAV, forward. 
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Table 1  Ascent vehicle characteristics comparison: Moon (Apollo) vs.Mars 
Driving Characteristic State of the Art (Apollo) Example MAV 
Crew size 2 4-6 
Ascent Delta-v 2 km/s 4-6 km/s 
Ascent Rendezvous Time 2 hours 43 hours 
Dormant Duration 4 days ~2000 days 
Propellant Load 2.5 mt 30 mt 
Propellant Type Earth Storable Soft Cryogenic 
Environmental Exposure Deep Space / Limited Dust Deep Space / Dust 
External Interfaces Minimal Multiple Interfaces 
Mission Mode Brought with the crew Pre-deployed ahead of crew 
Communication lag with Earth 2.5 seconds 480-2400 seconds 
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Figure 2  MAV Interfaces within the System-of-Systems Architecture. 
1.3. Secondary Challenges 
1.3.1. Cryogenic Fluid Management 
Cryogenic fluid management (CFM) is a key feature of NASA’s long-term mission to Mars. Current 
mission architectures require that cryogens be stored for extended periods of time, up to 9 years. Active 
cooling (cryocoolers), passive storage (insulation, low conductivity structure, etc.) and low leakage 
components are needed for long term storage of cryogens, and to efficiently liquefy ISRU-generated 
propellants for tank replenishment on the Martian surface. There are three elements of propellant 
management which require further technology development efforts to mature the technologies prior to an 
integrated system demonstration or flight demonstration: 1) High-efficiency, high-capacity cryocoolers, 
2) Soft vacuum insulation for Mars environments and 3) Operational considerations for liquefaction.  
Only the cryocoolers would need to be tested in space in order to demonstrate long-duration storage of 
cryogenic propellants. 
1.3.1.1. Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
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The current state-of-the-art (SOA) in CFM technology is spray-on foam insulation (SOFI), multi-layer 
insulation (MLI), cryogenic flight valves with leakages on the order of 100 cubic inches per minute 
(CIM) and low-capacity (20 watts) cryocoolers (both 20 and 90 K). 
 
SOFI is only effective at atmospheric conditions and MLI requires a low vacuum environment. The 
Martian atmosphere unfortunately is a soft-vacuum CO2 (5-7 Torr) limiting the usefulness of MLI. 
Several vendors have looked at concepts that could potentially be used for a MAV application, although 
all are in the early phases of development. SOA cryocoolers do not have the refrigeration capacity needed. 
The refrigeration capacity needs to be increased at least an order of magnitude from the existing 20 W 
capability.  Valves need to be developed to lower the SOA leakage rates while maintaining low heat loads 
into the tank and lightweight actuation devices to assure propellant is preserved long enough to meet 
mission requirements.  Non-cryogenic propellants could be a credible fallback technology (depending on 
final mission payload size, crew size, and mission architecture). 
1.3.1.2. Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole 
NASA is working with industry via Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) activities for the 
development of high-efficiency, high-capacity cryocoolers and advanced insulation concepts. NASA has 
begun working in-house on the development of long-duration cryogenic valves and actuators including 
funding multiple external efforts as well.  NASA is also beginning the development of technologies and 
planning demonstrations under NASA’s Lander Technologies Advanced Exploration Systems project, 
which includes the liquefaction of “ISRU -ike” propellants and maintaining zero boil-off during long 
duration storage. 
1.3.1.3. Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
Maximizing the cooling efficiency of the integrated system is key for long-duration storage.  Liquefaction 
demonstration will include integrating the cryocooler heat exchanger into the tank wall to maximize heat 
exchanger surface area.  Advanced insulation concepts are being examined which make use of MLI, but 
in configurations which make it effective in atmosphere and allow it to withstand the aero-thermal loads 
associated with a launch environment. 
1.3.2. Engine Development 
NASA’s and industry’s mission architecture and system trade studies have shown that propellant choice 
and specific impulse (Isp) capability have a strong impact on the size and mass of the ascent vehicle or 
stage.  The most recent trades have indicated that a liquid oxygen (LOx) and methane (CH4) propellant 
choice provides adequate Isp, minimizes the tankage volume, has a higher cryogenic storage technology 
readiness, and can provide additional mission benefits when combined with Mars ISRU plans. The 
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predominate system benefits at the propulsion level are the elimination of heaters typical for storable 
propellants and avoiding the use of extreme (20 K) active cooling as with liquid hydrogen (LH2). The 
Mars ascent vehicle is assumed to use LOx/CH4 as the primary and RCS propellants in the context of the 
following discussion.8, 9, 10, 11 
1.3.2.1. Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
The current state of knowledge (i.e., 2016) with LOx/CH4 rocket engines in the 22 to 155 kN size is 
limited to component design and testing applicable to ascent and descent propulsion for a Mars lander.  
Several engine thrust chambers, between 0.5 and 22 kN thrust size, have been run with GOx/CH4 or 
LOx/CH4 propellants by NASA and industry during 2010 and 2011. NASA and industry have tested 
pressure-fed gaseous thrusters and recently, under the Morpheus Lander project, where a 24 kN pressure-
fed engine was operated. Current pressure-fed engine approaches by the NASA Morpheus lander and the 
RS-18 demonstrators are in the 20 kN class and are pressure-fed. Larger booster engines are in 
development by Space X and Blue Origin, but their thrust is between 2,000 to 3,500 kN and are not being 
designed for multiple start, in-space operation. Legacy work has been performed on engine systems in the 
66 kN size derived from the RL10 LOx/Hydrogen (H2) engine used with LOx/CH4 propellants in the late 
1960s.  The performance for a fully loaded MAV that is between 30 to 40 mt will most likely require a 
pump-fed gas generator or expander cycle engine approach.  No such engine is currently in development 
nor have LOx/ CH4 propellants been used operationally. 
 
If non-cryogenic propellants were chosen as a fallback technology, then a new engine development could 
be based on a scaled-up and throttleable version of the RS-72 engine. The performance is lower than 
LOx/CH4 and selection would be dependent on the mission architecture solution.12 
1.3.2.2. Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole 
																																																								
8  Grayson, Gary D., “Propellant Trade Study for Crew Space Vehicle,” AIAA 2005-4313, 
AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit 10 -13 July 2005, Tucson, Arizona, 2005. 
9   Drake, Bret, G., and Kevin D. Watts, ed., “Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0, 
Addendum 2,” NASA SP-2009-566-ADD2, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Johnson Space 
Center, Houston, Texas, March 2014. 
10   Polsgrove, Tara, D. Thomas, S. Sutherlin, W. Stephens and M. Rucker, “Mars Ascent Vehicle Design for Human 
Exploration,” AIAA 2015-4416, AIAA Space 2015 Conference and Exposition 31 Aug.-2 Sept., Pasadena, 
California, 2015. 
11   Sanders, Gerry, A. Paz, L. Oryshchyn, K. Araghi, A. C. Muscatello, D. L. Linne, J. E. Kleinhenz, and T. Peters, 
“Mars ISRU for Production of Mission Critical Consumables-Options, Recent Studies, and Current state of the Art,” 
AIAA 2015-4458, AIAA SPACE 2015 Conference and Exposition 31 Aug.-2 Sept., Pasadena, California, 2015.	12			Dressler, Gordon, L. W. Matuszak, and D. D. Stephenson, “Study of a High-Energy Upper Stge for Future 
Shuttle Missions,” AIAA 2003-5128, 39th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit 20-23 
July 2003, Huntsville, AL, 2003.	
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A strategy should be put in place that starts technology development activities aligned with MAV 
propulsion needs for a pump-fed, 20-30 kN engine system immediately if humans are to be on the Mars 
surface by the 2030s. These activities should build off recent lower thrust chamber work by NASA and 
extend the testing to higher thrust levels to confirm LOx/CH4 engine control systems, combustion 
stability, turbopump operability, robust ignition systems, and throttling range. Other areas that should be 
addressed are reducing or minimizing valve and chill-down conditioning leakage and limiting 
environment exposure and engine seal conditioning for long-term dormancy on the Mars surface. These 
should be a priority for testing. 
1.3.2.3. Innovative Strategies to Close the Long Pole 
To reduce the engine cost, the strategy should build off recent advances in additive manufacturing by 
NASA Marshall on LOx/CH4 engine components, recent work by industry such as the Common 
Extensible Cryogenic Engine (CECE) based on the LOx/LH2 RL10, as well as other propulsion being 
developed for commercial launch upper stages. Testing at NASA facilities on LOx/CH4 engine 
components should continue and new elements such as turbopump systems, main combustor cooling rigs 
for gas generator and expander designs, and robust injector designs to reduce the engine development risk 
should also be added. This provides benefits in several areas for obtaining LOx/CH4 propulsion in the 
thrust-class required for the MAV such as reducing the cost for full scale development, gaining 
experience with in-space operability, and reducing the technical risk with early use on other stage 
applications or on an in-space demonstrator before the MAV is needed. The LOx/CH4 propulsion 
technology is around Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 4 to 5 and simply needs some additional design 
efforts focused on the MAV application to get it to TRL 6-7. Flying the propulsion on a demonstrator 
stage that provides integrated testing to verify the cryogenic fluid management systems with LOx/CH4 is 
another key area that has synergy with any effort to mature a LOx/CH4 propulsion system for the MAV or 
any in-space stage.13, 14 
1.3.3. Habitation Systems and Crew Access 
For the most part, habitation and crew access technologies are either available or being developed for 
other elements of a Mars architecture, such as a surface habitat. The long pole for habitation and crew 
access is dependent upon decisions on three key MAV functional requirements: how many crew the 
MAV will carry, how long crew will live inside the MAV, and what restrictions will be placed on martian 
dust brought into the MAV cabin from the surface. The design of a two-crew, one-day MAV with few 																																																								
13   Crocker, Andrew, Peery, S. , “System Sensitivity Studies of a LOX/Methane Expander Cycle Upper Stage 
Engine,” AIAA 1998-3674, 34th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference & Exhibit 13-15 July 1998, 
Cleveland, Ohio, 1998. 
14   Posgrove, Tara, et. al., “Human Mars Lander Design for NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign,” IEEE M16-5076, 
37th IEEE Aerospace Conference, 5 – 12 March, Big Sky, Montana, 2016. 
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planetary protection restrictions will be significantly different from a six-crew, three-day MAV with no 
allowable reverse contamination.  
 
Deciding how many crew the MAV must accommodate is likely to depend on many factors including 
international partnership agreements made at the Agency level, and may be influenced by other programs, 
such as how many crew Orion can launch and subsequently return to Earth. The duration that crew must 
be sustained inside the MAV is a function of Mars destination orbit, which in turn is a function of in-
space architecture—and that may well be influenced by the introduction of new commercial providers. 
Destination orbit may also be influenced by surface landing site selection, which in turn will be 
influenced by the science community as well as by surface resource needs such as in situ resource 
utilization propellant production. Habitable duration will also be influenced by whether the crew lands on 
Mars inside the MAV and how long they would have to remain in the MAV after landing, which is a 
function of surface architecture and crew physical condition.15  Any requirements for abort to orbit during 
EDL and the ability to survive off-target landing anomalies could also be factors in MAV habitation 
specifications. The level of planetary protection imposed on the MAV will be determined by the 
international community, with reverse contamination back to Earth a primary consideration.16 
1.3.3.1. Current State of Knowledge and Practice 
1.3.3.2. MAV habitability and crew access drives MAV cabin size,17 which in turn drives 
MAV propellant load, and together these set the minimum Mars lander mass (Figure 
3). For this reason, MAV habitability cannot be patterned after the relatively large 
Orion capsule. Even with Earth-reentry equipment stripped out, Orion would require 
an enormous quantity of ascent propellant and drive the Mars lander size. If the MAV 
carries more than three crew, neither a Soyuz nor Apollo-style capsule would be large 
enough, even for a short ascent. If the MAV’s destination is a five-sol orbit, a Soyuz 
descent capsule would not be large enough for the estimated Mars ascent period, even 
with only two or three crew, and an Apollo-style capsule would be limited to 3 crew. 
Current state of the art vehicles use ingress/egress hatches, but Apollo experience 
shows this will make planetary protection dust abatement difficult,18 and studies 
indicate it may add unnecessary mass to the MAV. Heritage life support systems 																																																								
15   Moore, S.T. and H.G. MacDougall, Journey to Mars: Physiological Effects and Operational Consequences of 
Long-Duration Microgravity Exposure,” Journal of Cosmology, 2010, Vol 12, 3781-3793. 
16   NPI 8020.7, NPD 8020.7G, NASA Policy on Planetary Protection Requirements for Human Extraterrestrial 
Missions, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, 2014.	
17   Rucker, M.A., Mars Ascent Vehicle Design Considerations, AIAA-2015-4518, American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) SPACE 2015, Pasadena, 2015. 
18   Wagner, S.A., The Apollo Experience Lessons Learned for Constellation Lunar Dust Management, NASA/TP-
213726, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Johnson Space Center, September 2006. 
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designed to work in the hard vacuum of low Earth orbit or the Moon would work well 
for the in-flight portion of a Mars ascent, but pre-ascent time on the surface will 
require slightly different technologies that are compatible with the Martian 
atmosphere.19  Although those life support technologies would have to be developed 
for a long duration Mars surface habitat anyway, the MAV application may be unique. 
For example, regenerative life support systems make sense for a very long-duration 
surface habitat, but may not trade well for mass on a very short ascent duration MAV. 
1.3.3.3. Current Strategies and Priorities to Close the Long Pole 
A number of studies have evaluated exploration crew complement, with recommendations pointing to a 
minimum of six crew for long-duration missions.20  The most recent MAV conceptual designs have been 
limited to four crew, but could be expanded to six crew. NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign traded 
numerous architecture options, destination orbits, and operational schemes to determine break points for 
various destination orbits, and the Mars Study Capability Team is continuing this work. As a general rule 
of thumb, the lower the destination orbit, the lower the MAV mass will be, but lower orbits will push in-
space transportation masses up. The planetary protection community conducted a workshop in October, 
2016 to begin refining Mars human mission requirements. Commercial launch providers are developing 
Earth launch/entry crew capsules that could potentially be paired with a Mars ascent propulsion system. 
 
 
																																																								
19   Schneider, W.F., et al., ICES-2016-40, NASA Environmental Control and Life Support Technology 
Development and Maturation for Exploration: 2015 to 2016 Overview, 46th International Conference on 
Environmental Systems, Vienna (2016). 
20   Drake, Bret, G, editor, “Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0, Addendum,” NASA 
SP-2009-566-ADD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, 
July 2009, pages 148-154.	
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Figure 3  MAV decisions drive much of the overall architecture. 
 
 
  
	 71	
Long Pole 8: Human Health and Biomedicine 
 
The Long Pole 
Crew health and performance are critical to successful human exploration beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). 
The work of NASA’s Human Research Program (HRP), see https://www.nasa.gov/hrp, is essential to 
enabling extended periods of space exploration through research and technology development (R&TD) 
activities that are aimed at mitigating risks to human health and performance. This program delivers 
human health and performance countermeasures, knowledge, technologies and tools to enable safe, 
reliable, and productive human space exploration.  
 
This chapter of the AM IV report is derived from the Integrated Research Plan (IRP), see 
https://humanresearchroadmap.nasa.gov/Documents/IRP_Rev_H.pdf, as maintained by the Human 
Research Program. The IRP is updated on a regular basis as the evidence base changes, and describes 
HRP’s approach and R&TD activities that are intended to address the needs of human space exploration. 
As new knowledge is gained, the required approach to R&TD activities may change.  
 
The IRP serves the following purposes for the Human Research Program:  
• Provides a means to ensure that the most significant risks to human space explorers are being 
adequately mitigated and/or addressed.  
• Shows the relationship of R&TD activities to expected deliverables.  
• Shows the interrelationships among R&TD activities that may interact to produce deliverables that 
affect multiple HRP Elements, Portfolios, Projects or research disciplines.  
• Accommodates the uncertain outcomes of R&TD activities by including milestones that lead to 
potential follow-on activities.  
• Shows the assignments of responsibility within the program organization and, as practical, the proposed 
acquisition strategy.  
• Shows the intended use of research platforms such as:  
• The International Space Station (ISS); 
• NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) at Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long 
Island, NY; and 
• Various spaceflight analog environments including the Human Exploration Research 
Analog (HERA) at Johnson Space Center (JSC).  
• Shows the budgeted and unbudgeted R&TD activities of the Human Research Program, but does not 
show all budgeted activities, as some of these are enabling functions, such as management, facilities, and 
infrastructure, and others are internal/discretionary tasks. 
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Statement of Achievability 
The achievability of this long pole – meaning adequate health and performance protection of astronauts 
during future deep space long duration missions - is expected to be possible based on a risk mitigation 
strategy that is very focused and applied. Human spaceflight risks include physiological and performance 
effects from the hazards of spaceflight, such as altered gravity, space radiation, and hostile environments, 
as well as unique challenges related to medical support, human factors, and behavioral health support. 
Risks and Concerns within the HRP research portfolio are identified by the Human System Risk Board 
(HSRB), a function of NASA’s Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO), as those for 
which research activity is a major component of the mitigation strategies, and are assigned to an Element 
within the HRP to quantify, mitigate, or monitor. 
 
The HSRB uses the following broad categories of Design Reference Missions (DRM) to provide 
flexibility in risk characterization and assessment that will be applicable to human space exploration 
missions yet to be defined:  
 
• Low Earth Orbit; 
• Deep Space Sortie;  
• Lunar Visit/Habitation;  
• Deep Space Journey/Habitation; and  
• Planetary.  
A Risk has a clear likelihood and consequence supported by evidence. Risks in the IRP are assigned 
Likelihood and Consequence (LxC) ratings (see Figure 1, below) and Risk Dispositions (see Figure 2, 
below) either from the HSRB or HRP. The LxC ratings are assessed for two consequence categories (in-
mission health and performance outcomes [Operations], and long-term health) based on scales defined by 
the HSRB and have associated colors (red, yellow, green) based on where the scores fall within the risk 
matrix. A Concern currently does not have sufficient evidence to perform an LxC assessment or 
determine a risk disposition for a given DRM; the objective of ongoing research is to assemble the 
evidence necessary to generate an LxC assessment. 
 
Figure 1. Likelihood by Consequence (LxC) Matrix; Source: Human System Risk Management Plan – 
JSC 66705 
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The HSRB maintains a risk record system for approved risk summary reports and supporting evidence for 
all the risks (including those not assigned to HRP) in its portfolio. This set of information is used by the 
HSRB to track and monitor the status of the risks, and to inform its decisions. HRP utilizes the HSRB as a 
forum to communicate updates to risks resulting from HRP R&TD activities. 
 
For each risk, the responsible HRP Element identifies gaps in knowledge that are germane to 
characterizing the risk and the ability to mitigate the risk. Gaps represent the critical questions that need to 
be answered to mitigate a risk and therefore serve to focus the areas of research work to address risk 
reduction milestones. In some cases a gap may map to more than one risk. 
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Figure 2. Risk Dispositions as Depicted by HRP’s Integrated Path to Risk Reduction (PRR) 
 
 
 
Red Risks For Future Manned Deep Space Missions 
 
1. Risk of Spaceflight-Induced Intracranial Hypertension/Vision Alterations 
 
Astronauts working and living in space during long duration ISS missions have experienced ophthalmic 
anatomical changes and visual performance decrements of varying degrees, which are hypothesized to be 
related to increased intracranial pressure secondary to the headward fluid redistribution of weightlessness. 
Presently these symptoms have manifested themselves as changes in eye structure such as optic disc 
edema, globe flattening, choroidal folds, cotton wool spots, increased nerve fiber layer and/or decreased 
near vision along with post-mission spinal opening pressures ranging from 18-28.5 cm H2O for 
symptomatic astronauts. Present pre-, in-, and post-flight data indicate that after approximately six 
months of space flight, 21 of 30 U.S. crewmembers that have been evaluated have shown symptoms of 
the Visual Impairment/Intracranial Pressure (VIIP) syndrome. The cases are graded based on the criteria 
in the VIIP clinical practice guidelines. The symptoms considered are refractive changes, presences of 
globe flattening, choroidal folds, cotton wool spots and/or increased retinal nerve fiber layer along with 
the severity of optic disc edema (using the Frisen Scale). Incidence to date has shown a rate of 70% of 
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those tested with a 20% rate for the most severe clinically significant classes (i.e., so-called classes 3 and 
4). 
 
Leading hypotheses for the VIIP syndrome are currently being investigated with a series of ground and 
flight studies. Ultimately, the goal of both Space Medicine Operations and HRP is a set of preventative 
and treatment countermeasures for the syndrome. The VIIP Research and Clinical Advisory Panel, 
comprised of recognized experts in fields relevant to VIIP, monitors progress and provides guidance to 
NASA. 
 
2. Risk of Cardiac Rhythm Problems 
 
There have been several reports of cardiac arrhythmias during long-duration spaceflight, the most serious 
being the case of a Russian cosmonaut who was deorbited due to a serious arrhythmia. Some cardiac 
rhythm problems have been related to cardiovascular disease (CVD), but it is unclear whether this was 
due to pre-existing conditions or to the effects of spaceflight. It is believed that advanced screening for 
coronary disease has greatly mitigated this risk. Other heart rhythm problems, such as atrial fibrillation, 
can develop over time, necessitating periodic screening of crewmembers’ heart rhythms. Beyond these 
terrestrial heart risks, exposure to certain elements of space flight, such as radiation, stress, and altered 
diet and exercise may potentiate both rhythm disturbances and vascular disease, not only during flight, 
but for years post-flight. 
 
Limited data are available to definitively establish the individual roles of spaceflight stressors (i.e., 
exposure to microgravity, radiation, oxidative and mental stress, or lifestyle alterations in diet and 
exercise) on short-term and long-term cardiovascular health outcomes. Existing evidence suggests 
increased vascular stiffness and carotid intimal media thickness immediately post-flight, but it is unclear 
if these effects persist or resolve over time.  It is hypothesized that the cumulative effect of spaceflight 
stressors might increase the long-term cardiovascular disease risk for crewmembers, although the role of 
the individual risk factors and the scope of these long-term effects are insufficiently understood.  
In regards to this cardiac rhythms risk, the research approach of HRP includes retrospective data mining 
and flight and ground studies to identify the role of the risk factors outlined above. Importantly, many 
questions regarding these risk factors can only be answered using actual space flight exposures, because it 
is hypothesized that it is the “total spaceflight environment” (i.e. accumulation of all risk factors listed) 
that contributes to long-term cardiovascular disease risk. As such, preflight, in-flight, and post-flight crew 
testing is currently being performed to ameliorate this important risk to crew member health. 
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3. Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Other Degenerative Tissue Effects from Radiation Exposure 
 
Recently, several epidemiological studies, including results from atomic-bomb survivors and nuclear 
reactor workers, have identified an increased risk of stroke and coronary heart disease from low-linear 
energy transfer (LET) radiation at doses comparable to those of a Mars mission, or a large solar particle 
event (SPE) during a lunar mission. Because the risk of heart disease as a result of exposure to space 
radiation has only recently been identified, preliminary studies in these areas are seeking to establish 
possible distinctions in mechanisms for this risk, between protons, high charge and energy (HZE) nuclei, 
and gamma rays. As an adjunct, HRP will take advantage of studies by the European Union in this area. 
These studies should present new insights into the nature of the low LET (e.g., gamma-ray) radiation risk 
at low dose-rates comparable to space conditions, and should identify appropriate mouse strains to be 
used in future studies. 
 
Exposure to ionizing radiation is associated with an increased risk for development of heart disease, 
stroke and other degenerative tissue diseases such as cataracts later in life or well after flight. It is 
currently unknown whether there are significant synergistic effects from other secondary spaceflight 
factors (i.e., altered and reduced gravity, stress, immune status, bone loss, etc.) that may alter morbidity 
and mortality estimates for late effects resulting from space radiation exposures. Once the 
pathophysiology of radiation-induced CVD is established and well-characterized, research to test 
potential interactions between radiation exposure and other identified spaceflight factors will be 
performed as required. 
 
4. Risk of Radiation Carcinogenesis 
 
Near-term goals for cancer research focus on reducing the uncertainties in risk projections through the 
development of tissue specific models of cancer risks, and the underlying mechanistic understanding of 
these models, and appropriate data collection at NSRL. In the long term, extensive validation of these 
models with mixed radiation fields and chronic exposures is envisioned, and research on biological 
countermeasures and biomarkers will be pursued. Research on improving cancer projections has two 
major emphases, as follows: 
 
(1) Testing the correctness of the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) model; and 
(2) Reducing the uncertainties in the coefficients that enter into the cancer projection model.  
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Research on the validity of the NCRP model relies on studies at the NSRL observing qualitative 
differences in biological damage - comparing the effects of HZE nuclei and gamma rays (low LET 
radiation) and the establishment of how these differences relate to cancer risk. 
 
There are distinct mechanisms of cancer induction across and within major tissue sites, and uncertainty 
reduction requires tissue specific risk estimates. Proposal selections through the NASA Research 
Announcement (NRA) and NASA Specialized Center of Research (NSCOR) mechanisms focus on cancer 
affecting the following major organs and sites: lung, breast, colon, stomach, esophagus, the blood system 
(leukemias), liver, bladder, skin, and brain. There are differences in radiation sensitivity based on genetic 
and epigenetic factors and research in these areas aids the development of tissue-specific cancer models. 
The approach to risk quantification and uncertainty reduction is based on modifying the current model for 
projecting cancer incidence and mortality risks for space missions. The cancer rate is the key quantity in 
the evaluation, representing the probability of observing a cancer at a given age and time period (i.e., the 
number of years) since exposure. The life-span study of the Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb is the 
primary source for gamma ray data. More recently, however, meta-analysis of data for several tissue types 
from patients exposed to radiation or reactor workers has become available. 
 
These newer data are being used to check or replace the Japanese atomic bomb survivor data. Other 
assumptions in the model are made with regard to the transfer of risk across populations, the use of 
average rates for the U.S. population, age, and age-after exposure dependence of risk on radiation quality 
and dose rate, etc. 
 
Collaborative research with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Low Dose Research Program remains a 
key component of the strategy. The DOE program focus is on low LET irradiation; and collaborative 
grants have been selected from proposals that contain one or more specific aims addressing NASA 
interests using the NSRL. This research augments research funded by NASA’s HRP with a number of 
grants that use state-of-the art approaches, i.e., genetics, proteomics, and transgenic animal models, etc. 
 
Determining the shape of the dose-response model for cancer induction is a near-term focus that is 
enumerated in biological terms through various cancer gaps. In the NCRP model, the relationship 
between dose and response is linear and the slope coefficient is modulated by radiation shielding. Models 
of non-targeted cancer risk describe processes by which cells traversed by HZE nuclei or protons produce 
cancer phenotypes in regions of tissue not limited to the traversed cells. Non-targeted effects are the 
major mechanism that has been identified that is in disagreement with the NCRP model, and they show a 
sub-linear dose response. The implications of such a dose response for cancer risk are large since such a 
model predicts a reduced effectiveness for radiation shielding. The importance of mission length is also 
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affected by the sub-linear dose response. For some cancer sites and exposure conditions, for example 
proton exposures, the NCRP model may be adequate. NSRL research is focused on reducing the 
uncertainties in the model through the establishment of tissue-specific models of human cancers, and on 
collection of data at NSRL for a variety of ground-based analogs simulating solar particle events (SPE) 
and galactic cosmic rays (GCR). 
 
Systems biology models provide a framework to integrate mechanistic studies of cancer risk across 
multiple levels of understanding (i.e., molecular, cellular, and tissue), and are the most likely approach to 
replace the NCRP model. Systems biology models are being developed by the Risk Assessment Project 
and several NSCORs, and, in conjunction with data collection, will improve the descriptions of cancer 
risk, laying a framework for future biological countermeasure evaluations and biomarker identification. 
 
5. Risk of Unacceptable Health and Mission Outcomes due to Limitations of In-Flight Medical 
Capabilities 
 
One objective of the HRP is to minimize or reduce the risk of unacceptable health and mission outcomes 
due to limitations of in-flight medical capabilities on human exploration missions. Medical conditions of 
varying complexity are expected to occur during these long-duration missions outside of LEO to 
destinations such as the Moon, asteroids, or Mars. Several factors necessitate increased medical 
capabilities on such missions. Mission lengths for these missions may range from several weeks to 
several years, and the number of medical events is expected to increase with mission length. Additionally, 
mission architecture and orbital mechanics may preclude timely evacuation during certain phases of 
exploration missions. Further, consultation with medical experts on Earth may be hindered by 
communication delay or blackout periods. Thus, medical care, including emergency treatment and 
psychological support, will be rendered by the crew in an autonomous fashion during certain periods. 
 
Genuine difficulties in providing medical care on exploration missions include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
 
(1) Resource constraints resulting from the boundaries of the mission design and architecture (volume, 
mass, power) dictating that only the most critical medical equipment can be stored onboard the space 
vehicles and delivered to the space habitats; 
(2) The potential for delivery of medical care by a non-physician for missions outside of LEO less than 
210 days in length; 
(3) Limited pre-flight crew training time necessitating tailoring of training to the medical knowledge, 
techniques and procedures that address the medical situations most likely to occur; 
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(4) The need for crewmembers to be prepared to respond to emergency medical conditions without real-
time support from Earth; and 
(5) The possibility of encountering unpredicted common illnesses, as well as ailments that may be unique 
to the space environment. 
 
HRP seeks to ensure crew health and secure mission success on exploration missions through: 
 
(1) Thorough pre-flight health status assessment, including new technological approaches, and 
(2) Development of a systematic approach to a more comprehensive autonomous health care system in 
space. 
 
A first step in mitigation of human health and performance risks is the establishment of human 
spaceflight health standards. These standards are designed to address acceptable levels of human health 
and performance risks for exploration missions of varying complexity and duration. The OCHMO has 
established an initial set of standards that serves to guide the HRP in the expansion of its evidence base 
regarding human spaceflight health and performance risks. HRP sponsors research and technology 
development that may require modification or development of OCHMO maintained standards. 
Additionally, NASA exploration missions may require new knowledge and/or new technology 
development either to support current standards or to modify standards for mission success. In either 
situation, HRP in working with the Medical Operations Lead for standards, will determine gaps in 
knowledge in the current standards and identify tasks to close those gaps. 
 
Incidence rates and outcomes for relevant medical conditions have large uncertainties associated with 
them due to limited available operational and research data. The Exploration Medical Condition List 
(https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20110008645.pdf) was created and is analyzed 
regularly to determine gaps in knowledge about the incidence rates and outcomes of various medical 
conditions during spaceflight. Tasks are then assigned to further study, model, and use analog population 
data to better quantify these medical conditions. 
 
In addition, the Exploration Medical Condition List is analyzed for the capabilities required to monitor 
and treat the conditions based on the DRM defined within the HRP PRR. An analysis is performed to 
determine where gaps exist in current medical system capabilities and where efficiencies could be 
realized in the future. Based on when a capability or technology is needed, a technology watch is 
implemented or a capability development project is initiated. 
6. Risk of Bone Fracture Due to Spaceflight-Induced Changes to Bone 
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The Fracture and bone demineralization (osteoporosis) risks are interrelated by sharing the physiological 
outcomes of fracture. However, the type of fracture, the causality of fracture, the timing of the fracture 
incidence and the mitigation approach and resources for the two fracture related risks may be different. 
The definition of skeletal changes due to spaceflight will inform both risks. The combined research risk 
approaches are presented below. 
 
To address these risks, it is currently possible to: 
 
(1) Track the effect size of long duration missions by changes in bone mineral density, in biomarkers of 
bone turnover and in bone structure for the hip and spine, 
(2) Project if bone losses will occur during a Mars visit, and 
(3) Use such information to estimate the risk of fracture upon return to Earth after a Mars mission. 
 
However, these capabilities are not part of any requirements documents for Lunar or Mars missions. 
Currently there are indications that, after 6-month missions, bone quality, and thus bone strength, does not 
recover as quickly as bone mineral density. This discordant recovery dynamic may influence skeletal 
health after return to Earth and contribute to osteoporosis and fracture risk. Continuing to collect bone 
quality and bone mineral density data and analyze this information is essential for assessing long-term 
health risks to returning crew. 
 
In spite of the long history of collecting bone relevant data, there are still gaps in knowledge. Bone 
atrophy during spaceflight is well recognized and may require mitigation to prevent fractures, but the time 
course of in-flight bone changes has not been determined. Furthermore, the time course of post-flight 
recovery and the individual susceptibilities to multiple risk factors have not been defined well enough to 
assess the probability of fractures. Therefore, NASA solicits and selects proposals to gather these data. In 
addition, work is ongoing with the Space and Clinical Operations Division to obtain bone surveillance 
data. This is complicated by the fact that the current bone standards based upon diagnostic guidelines for 
age-related osteoporosis are not acceptable for assessing skeletal integrity in the younger-aged astronaut 
following prolonged spaceflight exposure. Thus, per the recommendation of clinical experts, an evidence 
base from population studies with fracture outcomes is being assembled and analyzed to generate a 
modified set of operating bands for skeletal integrity in astronauts. Finally, to address early-onset 
osteoporosis, methods to monitor the combined skeletal effects of spaceflight with effects of aging are 
required to predict fractures and to determine an intervention threshold to prevent premature, age-related 
fractures in the astronaut. Overall, the long-term goals of HRP are to develop and deliver 
countermeasures for long-term missions and to establish the efficacy of countermeasures according to the 
newly formulated standards for skeletal integrity. 
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The risk for fracture, however, requires integrating a biomechanical component. The Factor of Risk for 
fracture is defined as the ratio between the applied load vector to bone and the bone fracture load (which 
captures both magnitude and direction of load). Thus, the increased fracture risk induced by spaceflight is 
inferred collectively from the accelerated loss of bone mass, the changes in hip bone structure, and the 
probability that bones will be overloaded while working and performing tasks in an encumbered, atypical, 
unknown risk environment. The most critical work needed for this risk requires assessing in-flight 
changes in bone mass and structure over the course of ISS missions. This increased understanding of 
spaceflight effects on bone (particularly of hip, wrist, and spine) in LEO is limited but can help inform the 
probabilistic assessment of fracture risk for a future planetary mission, e.g., to Mars. These data will 
provide a basis for evaluating whether the expected loads/torques to bone during human performance on a 
mission will exceed the failure load of bone (i.e., fracture load). This knowledge can be used to direct 
mission operations planning. 
 
Notably, the Risk of Bone Fracture deals with fractures occurring during a mission up until landing on 
Earth. The incidence of fractures occurring after return to Earth, in contrast, are the domain of The Risk 
of Early Onset Osteoporosis Due to Spaceflight. The modalities and medical tests used to assess changes 
to bone mineral density and bone quality are applicable to both the Fracture and Osteoporosis risks. The 
independent gaps in the Risk of Bone Fracture address fracture healing and estimating fracture risk during 
a mission. 
 
7. Risk of Renal Stone Formation 
 
Research into nutrition and in anti-resorptive pharmaceutical agents is evaluating modifications to bone 
turnover - an established risk factor for renal stone formation. Ultrasound artifact diagnostics are being 
explored to improve early detection of kidney stones in the renal pelvis. The potential for moving renal 
stones through application of ultrasound is being developed as a non-invasive approach to providing 
clinical mitigation of renal stone risks. 
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8. Risk of Adverse Cognitive or Behavioral Conditions and Psychiatric Disorders 
 
Given the isolated, extreme and confined nature and extended duration of future space exploration 
missions, there is a possibility that 
 
(1) Adverse behavioral and cognitive conditions will occur; and 
(2) Behavioral and cognitive disorders could develop, should adverse behavioral and cognitive conditions 
be undetected and unmitigated. 
 
We do not have a full understanding of the detrimental impact that spaceflight missions of one-year and 
longer will have on behavior and performance. Evidence from ground-based analogs suggests there is a 
significant impact on the performance and behavioral health of individuals. Early detection of risk factors 
such as increased stress and decrements in cognition due to a variety of spaceflight stressors (e.g., high 
workload, circadian desynchrony, elevated carbon dioxide [CO2] levels, space radiation, diet and nutrition, 
separation from family, limited volume, confinement and isolation) during spaceflight is important to 
deter development of cognitive and behavioral degradations or a psychiatric condition that could seriously 
harm and negatively affect the individual or the crew, and pose serious consequences for accomplishing 
mission objectives or jeopardizing the mission altogether. Toward this end, HRP is developing methods 
for monitoring cognitive and behavioral health during long duration exploration missions, and adapting 
and refining various tools and technologies for use in the spaceflight environment. These measures and 
tools will be used to monitor, detect, and treat early risk factors. Analogs are utilized to test, further refine, 
and validate these measures for exploration missions. Countermeasures are also being developed for 
maintaining and enhancing behavior and performance and for treating cognitive and behavioral problems 
during and after long-duration isolated, confined, and highly autonomous missions. 
 
9. Risk of Performance Decrements and Adverse Health Outcomes Resulting From Sleep Loss, Circadian 
Desynchronization, and Work Overload 
 
Objective and subjective evidence indicates that during ISS missions, as on Space Shuttle missions, sleep 
is reduced and circadian rhythms are misaligned. The average nightly sleep duration of crewmembers for 
both short and long duration missions is around six hours, with crewmembers showing a significant 
increase in sleep duration once they return to Earth, indicating a sleep debt may have accrued on orbit. 
Ground evidence clearly demonstrates that performance impairments can occur when sleep is only 
attained in restricted quantities similar to that attained by astronauts in flight. While a correlation between 
sleep quantity and performance during spaceflight has not yet been established, HRP is characterizing the 
relationship between sleep quantity and vigilance and attention during spaceflight. Future data mining 
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efforts may also yield insights into the relationships between sleep duration and circadian phase with 
other outcomes (e.g., immune health, operational performance). 
 
Research aims to further characterize and quantify this risk by implementing studies on the ISS using 
standardized measures to evaluate performance relative to fatigue. Planned data mining efforts seek to 
further investigate contributors to sleep loss, fatigue, circadian desynchronization, and work overload, by 
evaluating environmental factors, individual vulnerabilities, and mission timelines. Ground assessments 
incorporating head-down tilt, varying CO₂ levels and other factors can allow for systematic assessment of 
additional stressors. The role of sleep and circadian phase in other outcomes will also be further evaluated 
through research in Earth analogs such as the HERA at JSC. 
 
Such investigations help to inform the optimal countermeasure strategy for mitigating the health and 
performance effects of sleep loss and related issues in flight. As an example, studies indicate that properly 
timed exposures to light of appropriate wavelengths can help maintain circadian alignment, and facilitate 
schedule shifting, performance and alertness. Current efforts aim to determine the operational protocols 
and technical requirements for lighting systems on the ISS, as well as future exploration vehicles. Other 
countermeasures that are currently being investigated include recommendations around sleep education 
and training; sleep-wake models of performance that can inform real time scheduling decisions as well as 
optimal ways to individualize countermeasure regimens; and investigations that seek to provide 
educational materials related to sleep-wake medications. The effectiveness of other potentially relevant 
countermeasure strategies, such as stress management, diet, and exercise, may also be assessed. 
 
10. Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies 
 
This risk focuses on the training of crew and mission support operators, both prior to and during flight, be 
it in microgravity or on another partial gravity surface. Currently, the training flow begins years before 
the mission, and crews have commented on the impact of early and drawn-out training on the level of 
training retention. Historically, spaceflight operations have mitigated potential execution errors in at least 
two ways: specially-trained crewmembers are assigned to missions or rotated into the operational 
environment when complex, mission-critical tasks must be performed; and, execution of tasks are closely 
monitored and supported by ground personnel who have access to far more information and expertise 
than an individual operator. However, emerging future mission architectures include long-duration 
operations in deep space. Simply increasing the pre-mission ground training time will not address the 
need for increased training retention, and may even exacerbate the issue. Deep space operations do not 
allow for assignment of new crew or rotation of crew to ground for training. Further, delays in 
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communication will have a disruptive effect on the ability of Earth-based flight controllers to monitor and 
support space operations in real time. Consequently, it is necessary to develop an understanding of how 
training can be tailored to better support long-duration deep space operations. This includes appropriate 
methods for Just-In-Time training, and the extent to which materials, procedures, and schedules of 
training should be modified. Performance errors of critical tasks may result in crew inefficiencies, failed 
mission objectives, and both short and long-term crew injuries. 
 
11. Risk of Ineffective or Toxic Medications Due to Long Term Storage 
 
The risks associated with use of expired or degraded medication are well-established. A special area of 
concern with respect to exploration missions is the safety and efficacy of medications throughout 
extended missions. HRP seeks to understand how medications are currently being used in spaceflight 
through a retrospective review of medication use and developing a dose tracker application that is 
currently in use on the ISS. Direct assessment of medication stability will be performed through a stability 
study including assessments of effects from room temperature, refrigerated, and radiation environments. 
Additionally, an in-flight medication analysis device is being developed which could provide point of use 
assessments for medication. 
 
12. Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness Due to an Inadequate Food System 
 
HRP is optimizing methods to prepare, preserve, package, stow, and ship space food while preserving the 
nutritional value and acceptability - and minimizing use of flight resources. The retort, irradiation, and 
freeze-drying processes currently used to produce shelf stable products reduce the nutrient content, and 
degradation continues through storage at ambient conditions. The nutritional content of 109 flight food 
items is currently being measured soon after processing, after one year, and after three years of ambient 
temperature storage to determine whether they meet the nutritional requirements as specified by the 
nutrition standards and as determined through the Nutrition Status Assessment 
(https://lsda.jsc.nasa.gov/scripts/experiment/exper.aspx?exp_index=1343). Studies of the stability of food 
nutrients will identify vitamins and amino acids at risk for degradation in the space food supply, and 
characterize degradation profiles of the unstable nutrients. 
 
Preliminary shelf life findings have indicated that the current food system is inadequate for long duration 
missions. A study investigating the effect of the ingredient formulation, the type of processing and 
packaging, and storage conditions has determined that no single solution will extend the nutrition and 
acceptability of the food system for longer duration missions. Hurdle approaches combining optimized 
formulation, packaging, processing, and storage solutions must be investigated. Methods to maintain food 
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system acceptability and nutrition over long duration missions, including implementation of a bio-
regenerative pick and eat salad crop supplemental system, are also under investigation. 
 
Reducing the flight resources required for the food system is a major goal due to the significant ratios of 
rocket size to mass of cargo delivered during an exploration mission. Nutrient dense foods must be 
developed to reduce the food and packaging mass and volume overhead. Food packaging materials must 
be developed that are compatible with novel processing technologies, minimize the mass and volume, and 
provide an adequate oxygen and moisture barrier to maintain the required shelf lives. These studies must 
provide solutions that overcome resource challenges during extended periods of food storage (i.e., 18 
months for ISS, up to 5 years for a long duration mission having pre-positioned food) without 
compromising nutrition and acceptability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The biomedical risks inherent in space exploration beyond low Earth orbit, and in particular those of 
future human expeditions to Mars, are the primary focus of the research and technology development 
efforts of NASA’s Human Research Program. This work is ongoing and, with the possibility of such 
missions within the next decade, assumes great relevance to NASA’s exploration goals. Efforts to date 
have quantified the risks to be encountered and have developed meaningful preventive and recuperative 
capabilities to protect and enhance the capabilities of astronauts participating in those missions. These 
efforts will continue, with a more applicable and operational focus in response to more well-defined 
exploration mission requirements. It is the goal of the Human Research Program to reduce the greatest 
human risks of space exploration missions to maximize astronaut safety, health and performance on what 
will certainly be the most complex, challenging, expensive and dangerous missions ever undertaken by 
human explorers. 
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Long Pole 9: Sustainability   
 
The Long Pole 
 
A sustainable enterprise is able to continue indefinitely until a deliberate decision is made to terminate it. 
The ultimate basis of sustainability is value – benefit – to stakeholders. Value whose creation and delivery 
is built in to the enterprise design and is then actually experienced by stakeholders, not simply asserted: 
value that is commensurate with the cost to produce it and value to stakeholders that have sufficient 
collective leverage to influence outcomes.  
 
Sustainability was judged to be a “long pole,” a critical capability, because it is an essential attribute of 
Mars exploration that is both enabled by and results in value to the Nation. It will enable Mars exploration 
to continue after the first several human missions unlike Apollo, which was never designed to be 
sustainable. It will defeat the “been there, done that” cliché that pervades modern culture and is a threat to 
sustained Mars exploration and its value to the Nation. 
 
Sustainability must be deliberately built in to the enterprise design. It will not just happen. It is often 
confused with affordability. If the enterprise were affordable surely it would be sustainable. Not so. An 
enterprise that is sustainable is by definition affordable but an enterprise that is affordable is not by 
definition sustainable.   
 
Statement of Achievability 
Sustainability is achievable. Both portent and guidepost to its achievability is the attention that it has 
received in high level NASA and stakeholder policies and studies such as:   
• NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate’s Sustainable Exploration 
Internal Principles (2016); 
• National Academies’ Pathways to Exploration Report (2014):21 “.. recommendations to enable a 
sustainable U.S. human spaceflight program;” 
• Bi-partisan NASA Authorization Act of 2010 human space exploration Long Term Goal 22: “.. to 
expand permanent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit …” and to achieve Key Objectives in 
doing so. A Goal ratified and expanded by the 2015 Pioneering Space National Summit.  																																																								21	National	Academies’	Pathways	to	Exploration:	Rationales	and	Approaches	for	a	U.S.	Program	of	Human	Space	Exploration	Report	(2014)	[https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18801/pathways-to-exploration-rationales-and-approaches-for-a-us-program];	ISBN:	978-0-309-30507-5		
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Significant contributions to sustainability can be made by embracing proven best practices in stakeholder 
engagement from other domains and by undertaking changes in NASA’s philosophy of human space 
flight and management structure, changes that respond to opportunities for improvement and to the 
evolving external environment.      
 
Primary Challenge to Closing the Long Pole:  
The primary challenge to closing the sustainability Long Pole is creating a critical mass and broad 
portfolio of international partner and in-space economic private sector stakeholders for the human 
exploration of Mars. A challenge that will require sustained leadership and vision to surmount.   A 
challenge that will require developing and pursuing an architecture that engages international partner and 
in-space economic private sector stakeholders, even if the architecture involves intermediate destinations 
or new business models to do so. The first step is a shared vision.  
 
This needs to be solved because these stakeholders are a critical component of sustainability.  
 
Secondary Challenges to Closing the Long Pole:   
Secondary challenges to closing the sustainability Long Pole are:  
1) Development and deployment of a narrative, a proven best practice of the themed attraction 
industry to engage stakeholders; 
2) Undertaking changes in NASA’s philosophy of human space flight and management structure, 
changes that respond to opportunities for improvement and to the evolving external environment.  
 
Narrative, as used in the themed attraction industry to engage stakeholders, is an enterprise organizing 
principle:   
• Narrative shapes the enterprise .. shapes and connects the dots. Strategy is narrative;  
• Narrative messages enterprise intent, value, and values;  
• Narrative engages enterprise stakeholders:  
ú Acknowledges their experiences and beliefs;  
ú Highlights their aspirations, accomplishments, and struggles; 
Because narrative drives all three – shaping, messaging, engagement – narrative promotes enterprise 
coherence and efficacy. In a system engineering sense, narrative is the Level 0 requirement to be 
deconstructed and flowed down to drive all other requirements.    																																																																																																																																																																																		22	NASA	Authorization	Act	of	2010	[https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/649377main_PL_111-267.pdf]		
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Narrative is based on value to the Nation and opportunity, and it evolves as they do. NASA human space 
exploration’s narrative today should be shaped by:  
• The NASA Authorization Act of 2010’s mandated long-term goal of NASA human spaceflight to 
“expand permanent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit;” 
• The National Academies’ “Pathways to Exploration” Report;  
• HEOMD’s Sustainable Exploration Internal Principles.   
To illustrate the concept, a case can be made that the narrative for NASA human space exploration has 
evolved to the present as shown in this figure. 
 
Deployment of the narrative should include an enduring strategic engagement campaign developed by 
relevant professionals making use of best practices from previous such campaigns in other domains.  
 
Changes in NASA’s philosophy of human space flight and management structure, changes responding to 
opportunities for improvement and to the evolving external environment, should include:       
• NASA moves from directing to orchestrating in mindset and management process;   
• Efficient acquisition methods; 
• Improved insight/oversight models; 
• Acceptance of appropriate risk; 
• Transparent funding processes and priorities.  
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Time to Close the Long Pole: At least 5 years  
 
Closing the Long Pole Requires Access To (at a minimum): 
Closure of the sustainability Long Pole requires access to any intermediate destination of importance to 
international partner and in-space economic private sector stakeholders. Potential intermediate 
destinations need to be used as a mechanism to build an ever-increasing base of international partner and 
in-space economic private sector stakeholders for sustained Mars exploration founded on mutual value. 
Intermediate destinations include: 
• Earth Surface 
• International Space Station 
• Any Earth orbit 
• High Earth Orbit/Cislunar 
• Lunar surface 
• Asteroids  
• Martian System 
 
Current Strategies to Close the Long Pole and Minimum Success Criteria 
NASA is currently undertaking a number of activities and approaches to close the sustainability Long 
Pole:    
• Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate’s (HEOMD) Sustainable Exploration 
Internal Principles;  
• International Space Station partnerships;  
• Global Exploration Roadmap;  
• Commercial Crew and Cargo Program; 
• Collaboration for Commercial Space Capabilities Program; 
• NextSTEP Program. 
Additional strategies will be required to address the Challenges to closing the sustainability Long Pole 
identified here.  
 
The minimum success criteria adequate to close the sustainability Long Pole is international partner and 
in-space economic private sector stakeholders adequate for indefinite sustainability.  
 
Closing this long pole has commonality with any other long pole that involves technology, systems, 
capabilities, etc. that could potentially be provided by an international partner or in-space economic 
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private sector stakeholder. Of special note is the logistics dimension of the 
Aggregation/Refueling/Resupply long pole because of its strong potential to do so.   
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APPENDICES			
Planetary	Protection	Considerations			
For	Affordable,	Achievable	and	Sustainable	Human	Missions	
	
An important aim of the AM IV workshop was to consider common elements of different human 
architectures, and to identify priority near-term actions and investments necessary to ensure achievability 
in the timescale of about two decades.  Now that the main ‘long poles’ have been identified and examined 
more closely, it is appropriate to focus on Planetary Protection and associated space policy and regulatory 
requirements because they represent challenges to different phases of mission plans.  A brief overview of 
planetary protection was presented at the workshop so that sub-groups were informed about current and 
future implications upon mission architecture and implementation.  Integrating planetary protection in the 
early planning phases will be important to encourage cross-cutting deliberations and planning, and avoid 
costly re-designs of major systems in later mission phases.  It is possible that incrementally improved, 
integrated and pre-tested systems will also avoid the need for major advances in many systems and 
substantially reduce overall costs of Mars missions while effectively addressing planetary protection 
needs.  Below is a brief overview of relevant studies, workshops and documents related to planetary 
protection and human missions to extraterrestrial locations. 
 
Historically, formal discussion of round trip Mars missions trace to the late 1990s when NASA began 
considering possible Mars Sample Return missions and associated needs for biocontainment, handling 
and test protocols upon return to Earth.23  Additional workshops and policy deliberations were undertaken 
by both NASA and various international experts between 2000-200524 to consider the implications of 
planetary protection policy for human missions to Mars.  Ultimately, these led to updated international 
																																																								
23 NASA, 2002. A Draft Test Protocol for Detecting Possible Biohazards in Martian Samples Returned to 
Earth. (J.D. Rummel et al. (eds.), NASA/CP-2002-211842, Washington DC Available:   
https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/summary/DraftTestProtocol 24	Among	the	noteworthy	early	human	workshop	reports	on	planetary	protection	are:		
NASA 2005, PP Issues in the Human Exploration of Mars, NASA/CP-2005-213461 (workshop held 2001)  
Available at:   https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents	
NRC, 2002.  Safe on Mars: Precursor Measurements Necessary to Support Human Operations on the Surface of 
Mars.  NRC, Space Studies Board.  http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10360.html 
MEPAG, 2005.  Report of the MEPAG Mars Human Precursor Science Steering Group:  An analysis of the 
Precursor Measurements of Mars Needed to Reduce the risk of the First Human Missions to Mars (D.W. 
Beatty et al., JPL Doc. I.D. CL#05-0381 (2005). https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents	
NASA, 2006.  Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection Workshop (held 2005). NASA TM-2006-
213485.  Hogan et al., Available: https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents	
ESA-NASA 2007.  ESA/NASA Joint Workshop on Planetary Protection & Human System Research and 
Technology. (workshop held 2005). ESA Report: WPP-276. 
https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents        		
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policy for human missions beyond Earth orbit, the first such guidelines since the Apollo era.25,26  The 
COSPAR PP Principles & Guidelines for Human Missions, which still provide the current framework for 
future human mission planning, are based on four overall principles and eight operating guidelines, as 
summarized in Table I. 
 
NASA’s overall framework for long duration human missions acknowledges that PP requirements will 
impact missions in many ways.27  While a planetary protection policy is in place for human missions to 
the Moon and other celestial bodies (COSPAR 2008), it is clear that defined protocols, technologies, and 
operational details must still be developed to address both robotic and human aspects of mission planning.    
Moreover, PP information and policies must be integrated early in mission planning to take advantage of 
synergies and cross-cutting efforts in many development activities.    
 
Already, many aspects of human mission planning are known to involve forward and backward 
contamination considerations, including: chemical pollutants detection and measurement; biological 
monitoring, and microbial identification; equipment decontamination, sterilization and reuse; sample 
containment and handling; advanced life support systems (ALS), including closed-loop recycling 
capabilities and waste handling & disposal; Extravehicular Activities (EVA) and equipment, including 
suits & associated life support and ingress/egress concerns; subsurface drilling equipment and operations; 
ISRU systems; laboratory–habitat separation; quarantine capabilities;  and possible robotic teleoperations 
for pre-cursor sampling and characterization. Fortunately, because missions to bodies like the Moon and 
asteroids are not constrained by planetary protection considerations, they can provide useful testbeds for 
technology and operations development that feed-forward to human missions on Mars surface.  
 
In order to move from current qualitative PP guidelines to detailed quantitative requirements, the PP 
Subcommittee (PPS) of the NASA Advisory Committee (NAC) adopted NPI  8020.728 outlining an 
incremental process as a path forward towards future development of NASA Procedural Requirement  
(NPR) for Human Missions.  A key part of this path forward included convening a Workshop on 
Planetary Protection  Knowledge Gaps for Extraterrestrial Missions, which analyzed and identified key 
knowledge gaps in three areas important to planetary protection: 1)  microbes and human health;  2) 																																																								25	COSPAR Principles and Guidelines for Human Missions to Mars, page A-5 in: COSPAR Planetary Protection 
Policy:  https//cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicy.pdf 
26 Conley, C.A. & J.D. Rummel, 2008. Planetary protection for humans in space: Mars and the Moon.  Acta 
Astronautica 63, 1025-1030 
27 NASA, 2012.  Mars Design Reference Architecture 5 (DRA), Addendum 2.0, Section 13, Planetary Protection, 
pages 78-84. Available: https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/documents 
28 NASA Planetary Protection Procedural Requirements Document for Human Extraterrestrial Missions (NPI 
8020.7).   See Introductory Material Section on: NPI 8020.7 and Path to Requirements, by B. Siegel  on 
https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/humanworkshop2015/ 
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technology and operations for contamination mitigation and control,  and 3) understanding natural 
dispersal/survival of microbes under Martian conditions.29  The workshop participants identified over two  
dozen specific R &TD topics that must be addressed before comprehensive PP requirements can 
formulated.  A subsequent COSPAR international workshop30 built upon the NASA Workshop findings, 
prioritized the R&TD gaps that were identified, and assessed different locations and mission prospects as 
possible test-beds to address gaps and study the effectiveness of planetary protection practices. (i.e. Earth 
analogues & simulations; ISS, lunar & cislunar; Mars, Phobos/Deimos).  The COSPAR report is 
currently in preparation and should be available in mid 2017.  
 
For more background information on Planetary Protection, including links to diverse NASA and 
COSPAR reports, refer to the Documents section of the NASA Planetary Protection Website:  
https://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
29 NASA Workshop on Planetary Protection Knowledge Gaps for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, 2015. (Rpt. 
published 2016): <http://hdl.handle.net/2060/20160012793> 
30 COSPAR Workshop on Refining Planetary Protection Requirements for Human Missions, 2016.   (publication 
expected in mid-2017)	
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       TABLE	I:	COSPAR	Planetary	Protection	Principles	and	Guidelines	for	Human	Missions											[Summarized	from:		https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicy.pdf   (page A-5)]																			
	
																																														PP	PRINCIPLES	for	Human	Missions	
v Safeguarding	the	Earth	from	potential	back	contamination	is	the	highest	planetary	protection	priority	in	Mars	exploration.	
v The	greater	capability	of	human	explorers	can	contribute	to	the	astrobiological	exploration	of	Mars	only	if	human-associated	contamination	is	controlled	and	understood.	
v For	a	landed	mission	conducting	surface	operations,	it	will	not	be	possible	for	all	human	associated	processes	and	mission	operations	to	be	conducted	within	entirely	closed	systems.	
v Crewmembers	exploring	Mars,	or	their	support	systems,	will	inevitably	be	exposed	to	Martian	materials.			 	 												PP	IMPLEMENTATION	GUIDELINES	for	Human	Missions:		
§ Continuous	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	terrestrial	microbes	will	be	needed	to	address	forward	and	backward	contamination	concerns	
§ A	quarantine	capability	(for	individuals	&	entire	crew)	is	needed	during	and	after	the	mission	
§ There	is	a	need	to	develop	comprehensive	planetary	protection	protocols	for	
combined	human	and	robotic	aspects	of	missions	
§ Neither	robotic	systems	nor	human	activities	should	contaminate	“Special	
Regions”	(water/ices)	
§ Uncharacterized	sites	should	be	evaluated	by	robotic	precursors	prior	to	crew	access		
§ Pristine	samples	or	sampling	components	from	uncharacterized	sites	or	Special	Regions	should	be	treated	as	planetary	protection	Category	V,	Restricted	Earth	
Return		
§ An	onboard	crewmember	should	be	designated	as	responsible	for	implementing	planetary	protection	measures	during	the	mission	
§ Planetary	protection	requirements	will	be	based	on	conservative	approach	and	not	relaxed	without	scientific	review,	justification,	and	consensus 
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